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ABSTRACT 
  Although the Supreme Court turned away an Establishment 
Clause challenge to the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the 
issues raised by that case will not go away anytime soon. Legal 
controversies over facially religious government speech have become 
one of the most regular and prominent features of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence—and indeed, a second-round challenge to the 
Pledge of Allegiance is currently percolating, which will likely result 
in resolution by the Supreme Court. That resolution will depend on 
an understanding of the social meaning of the practice at issue. 
  This Article addresses the constitutional analysis of “ceremonial 
deism”—brief official religious references such as the words “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the national motto “In God We 
Trust,” and the city names Corpus Christi and St. Louis. Courts have 
generally stated in holdings and dicta that ceremonial deism is 
constitutional because these phrases have lost their religious meaning 
through the passage of time or rote repetition. To examine this 
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claim—the “secularization” thesis—this Article draws on one 
particular branch of linguistic theory, known as speech act theory, as 
it applies to the problem of change in meaning over time. Because 
speech act theory is particularly useful for the analysis of social 
meaning, this Article contends that some insights about the problem 
of ceremonial deism may be found there, lending depth to an 
argument that has gone almost entirely untheorized by those who 
have espoused it. Finally, this Article considers the implications of this 
analysis for the constitutionality of these official religious references. 
Ultimately, while recognizing that meaning can change over time in 
some instances, this Article concludes that courts should be skeptical 
of this claim and should instead adopt a rebuttable presumption of 
enduring religious meaning when confronted with constitutional 
challenges to instances of ceremonial deism. 
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The past is never dead. It’s not even past. 
  – William Faulkner, REQUIEM FOR A NUN1 
QUESTION: . . . . [I]s it the Government’s position that the words, 
under God, have the same meaning today as when they were first 
inserted in the pledge? 
MR. OLSON: Yes and no . . . . 
QUESTION: Because it’s a terribly important question. 
  Oral argument, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow2 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of America’s national motto is in part a history of 
wars, both real and cultural. “In God We Trust” first came to be 
imprinted on coins in response to pleas like that from Reverend M.R. 
Watkinson to the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase.3 
Writing in 1861, in the midst of the Civil War, Reverend Watkinson 
exhorted: “What if our Republic were now shattered beyond 
reconstruction. Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries 
rightly reason from our past that we were a heathen nation.”4 What 
was needed, he continued, was an inscription on American currency 
that “would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism” and “place 
 
 1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 
1 (2004) (No. 02-1624). 
 3. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of “In God We Trust,” 
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009). Discussion of the history of the national motto and its inscription on currency may also 
be found in ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 568–71 (2d ed. 1964), and Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of 
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2122–24 (1996). 
 4. The Coin Library, In God We Trust on U.S. Coinage, http://www.coinlibrary.com/info/ 
ingodwetrust.html#Rev.%20Watkinson's%20Letter (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). The U.S. 
Treasury website misquotes this letter. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 3 (“What if our 
Republic were not shattered beyond reconstruction?”). 
HILL IN FINAL 12/1/2009  6:11:56 PM 
708 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:705 
us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed.”5 
After first appearing in 1864, “the motto was found missing from” 
certain gold coins in 1907, but “[i]n response to a general demand, 
Congress ordered it restored, and the Act of May 18, 1908, made it 
mandatory on all coins upon which it had previously appeared.”6 The 
phrase “In God We Trust” became the national motto in 1956.7 
The brief suspension of the motto’s inscription between 1907 and 
1909 occurred because President Theodore Roosevelt commissioned 
a new design for the coins that did not include the motto.8 The 
president defended his decision on the ground that the use of such a 
solemn motto on coins “comes dangerously close to sacrilege,” 
tending to cheapen it and open it up to “jest and ridicule,” as in 
phrases like “In God we trust for the [other] 8 cents.”9 The historical 
evidence suggests, however, that the decision was aesthetic rather 
than religious or constitutional in motive.10 In response to the ensuing 
popular uproar, Congress passed a bill requiring that the motto 
appear on coins again, and Roosevelt signed the bill.11 But it was not 
until much later, in a frenzy of religious piety mixed with patriotism 
not unlike that accompanying the motto’s initial appearance in the 
Civil War era, that “In God We Trust” was finally adopted as the 
 
 5. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Coinage Controversy, 18 AM. Q. 35, 
37 (1966). 
 9. President Roosevelt’s statement defending the motto-less coins appeared in the New 
York Times on November 14, 1907. Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
1907, at A1. In addition to making the argument about sacrilege, Roosevelt insisted that there 
was no “legal warrant” for placing the motto on the coins. Id. It is unclear whether this was 
because the legislation first providing for the motto’s inscription on currency authorized but did 
not require it, STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 568, or because the legislation was 
inadvertently omitted from the Revised Statutes of 1874, Gatewood, supra note 8, at 40 & n.20. 
 10. Gatewood, supra note 8, at 37, 41. 
 11. Id. at 50. 
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national motto.12 Around the same time, the Pledge of Allegiance was 
amended to include the words “under God.”13 
Today, the American Family Association (AFA) sponsors a 
campaign to put copies of the national motto in the public schools as 
“a reminder of the historical centrality of God in the life of our 
republic.”14 For a time, the AFA offered to provide a prototype 
poster, free of charge, that contained the motto in large capital letters 
on an American flag background.15 Seventeen state legislatures have 
required such postings.16 And in 2000, the U.S. House of 
Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution encouraging 
display of the national motto in public buildings.17 
The history of the motto demonstrates in many ways the 
dynamic concerning brief official references to religion—commonly 
known as “ceremonial deism”—that is central to this Article’s 
argument. It is a story about conflating the patriotic and the religious 
as a means of consolidating a national identity and, simultaneously, 
suppressing dissent. Both the introduction of the motto on coins and 
its official adoption by the national government occurred in contexts 
of religion-infused hypernationalism. Yet, it is also a story about the 
historicity of language—its ability to convey different messages in 
different historical contexts, from quasi-sacrilegious humor to a 
sincere assertion of the supremacy of God over human affairs. 
Finally, it is a story about the ability of language not only to describe 
 
 12. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 570; cf. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 
279 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing sources and noting that abolitionism and the Civil War stirred 
religious sentiments, suggesting that the nation was more religious than it was at the Founding); 
William Van Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall 
— A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 786 (describing the combined 
religious and patriotic fervor that prevailed both during the Civil War era and in the 1950s, 
when the motto was officially adopted and the words “under God” were added to the Pledge). 
 13. The Pledge was amended in 1954. Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 
Stat. 249; see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 570–71 (describing how a sermon 
attended by President Eisenhower in February 1954 spurred the Act’s speedy passage, with the 
president signing it into law in May 1954). 
 14. Am. Family Ass’n, ‘In God We Trust’ Poster Campaign, http://www.afa.net/igwt/ (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2009). I am grateful to Cassandra Robertson for bringing this website to my 
attention. 
 15. Id. (describing the poster campaign and displaying an image of the poster). 
 16. Id. (follow “Click here to see if your state already has a law” hyperlink). Those states 
are Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
Id. 
 17. H.R. Res. 548, 106th Cong. (2000). 
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but also to create a certain reality. Indeed, one cannot help but 
suspect that the act of instituting the national motto, or of requiring 
its posting in schools, is not so much an act of describing a universal 
truth as an attempt by a political or religious faction to install or shore 
up that reality. 
In light of this long, colorful, and ongoing history, can the 
national motto be said to be a religious expression? Is it an 
endorsement of religion or a proselytizing statement that violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?18 The national motto 
and its use on currency have been challenged in lower federal courts 
as unconstitutional establishments of religion. All such challenges 
have been turned away, primarily on the ground that the motto lacks 
any true religious or ritualistic force.19 Despite the obviously religious 
origins of the phrase, courts typically suggest that “through historical 
usage and ubiquity” the phrase has lost any and all force as an 
endorsement of belief in God.20 
Yet, from the brief narrative just set forth, it seems that the 
reality is much more complicated. From its beginning, the motto has 
combined notions of patriotism and religiosity. It is certainly capable 
of nonreligious use—witness Teddy Roosevelt’s citation of jokes 
about the motto with a decidedly secular bent—and it would probably 
be difficult to find anyone today for whom the inscription on currency 
carries deep spiritual meaning. Nonetheless, the AFA’s campaign to 
reinject God into the public school classroom demonstrates that the 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
 19. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996); Aronow v. United States, 432 
F.2d 242, 243–44 (9th Cir. 1970); Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075–76 
(E.D. Cal. 2006); O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 19–20 (W.D. Tex. 1978); cf. Lambeth v. 
Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 270–72 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a challenge to a particular 
county’s decision to inscribe the national motto on the façade of a government building, largely 
based on the view that the motto is secular). One challenge was rejected on procedural grounds. 
Schmidt v. Cline, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172–79 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting on standing and 
mootness grounds the plaintiffs’ challenge to the county treasurer’s display of a particular poster 
bearing the national motto but also noting that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the motto fails on the 
merits based on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Gaylor). Other challenges, not constituting direct 
Establishment Clause attacks on the motto itself, have also been raised and rejected. See 
Keplinger v. United States, No. 4:CV-06-946, 2006 WL 1455747 passim (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2006) 
(turning away a pro se challenge by a prisoner seeking to replace the word “God” with the word 
“Yahweh” in the Pledge, the national motto, and the song “America the Beautiful”); Myers v. 
Loudon County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1273–75 (E.D. Va. 2003) (rejecting an as-applied 
challenge to a public school’s display of a particular poster, which was donated by a religious 
group, bearing the national motto). 
 20. Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216. 
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motto’s meaning is still flexible and open-ended: if the motto has lost 
its religious force through time and repetition, the AFA, at least, must 
believe that that force can be revived. 
In the United States, the public culture is replete with brief 
official acknowledgements of religion that initially appear innocuous 
but pose thorny Establishment Clause problems. Examples range 
from the national motto, to the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, to the cities of Corpus Christi and St. Louis, to the phrase 
“in the Year of our Lord,” or the abbreviation A.D. on public 
documents.21 These brief religious references are often labeled 
ceremonial deism, although that term in many ways obscures more 
than it illuminates with respect to the broader set of phenomena 
discussed here.22 Some brief religious references—such as city 
names—are not accurately described as ceremonial, in that they do 
not have a ritualistic or solemnizing quality. Nor are all instances of 
so-called ceremonial deism in fact deistic—that is, they do not reflect 
a point of view that embraces belief in God but is nonsectarian. The 
phrase “in the year of our Lord” is a clear reference to Jesus Christ, 
and the use of saints’ names for city names is associated primarily 
with Roman Catholicism, which is unique in its recognition and 
 
 21. A.D. stands for anno domini, Latin for “in the year of the Lord.” 
 22. The phrase “ceremonial deism” was coined in 1962 by Eugene Rostow, former dean of 
the Yale Law School, and has been used occasionally by the Supreme Court. Arthur E. 
Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION 
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963)), cited in Epstein, supra note 3, at 2091. Epstein 
misattributes the phrase to Walter Rostow. Epstein, supra note 3, at 2091. Epstein defines 
ceremonial deism as 
all practices involving: 1) actual, symbolic, or ritualistic; 2) prayer, invocation, 
benediction, supplication, appeal, reverent reference to, or embrace of, a general or 
particular deity; 3) created, delivered, sponsored, or encouraged by government 
officials; 4) during governmental functions or ceremonies, in the form of patriotic 
expressions, or associated with holiday observances; 5) which, in and of themselves, 
are unlikely to indoctrinate or proselytize their audience; 6) which are not specifically 
designed to accommodate the free religious exercise of a particular group of citizens; 
and 7) which, as of this date, are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions. 
Id. at 2095. Epstein includes in this definition such arguably “private” speech as presidential 
addresses invoking God. Id. at 2109. I agree with his ultimate conclusion that such instances of 
quasi-private speech by public officials are not unconstitutional and that their regulation may 
raise free speech or free exercise concerns. Id. at 2142–43. I therefore do not address them 
further here. 
  In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), Justice O’Connor 
created her own test for determining when a practice amounts to an instance of ceremonial 
deism that does not violate the Establishment Clause, considering the factors of “[h]istory and 
[u]biquity,” “[a]bsence of worship or prayer,” “[a]bsence of reference to [a] particular religion,” 
and “[m]inimal religious content.” Id. at 37–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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veneration of particular saints. This Article nonetheless retains the 
term “ceremonial deism” as convenient shorthand, although the 
Article’s scope is both broader and narrower than that 
phenomenon—broader because it includes practices and brief 
linguistic references that are neither ceremonial nor merely deistic, 
but narrower because it focuses only on one justification for retaining 
those practices, namely, the “secularization” thesis. 
The focus of this Article is thus the wide range of practices, 
phrases, and other brief or passing religious references espoused by 
the government that have generally flown under the Establishment 
Clause radar, particularly on the theory that they somehow have lost 
their religious meaning. One might include in this list certain 
practices, such as the public celebration of the Christmas holiday or 
Sunday liquor laws. These examples may appear constitutionally 
problematic to a greater or lesser degree, but they are typically 
justified on the ground that, though religious in origin, they no longer 
carry any religious impact.23 As discussed below in Part I, both courts 
and commentators have dealt with such phrases, symbols, and 
practices in largely unsatisfactory ways, but the primary argument for 
their constitutionality is that they have lost their religious meaning 
through history or rote repetition. 
After describing how courts and commentators have addressed 
these sorts of practices, Part I of this Article briefly places the 
problem of ceremonial deism into the larger context of Establishment 
Clause doctrine, much of which is in flux or disarray. Despite this 
state of disorder, legal challenges to ceremonial deism are likely to 
arise in the near future—and indeed, a second-round challenge to the 
Pledge of Allegiance is currently percolating—requiring resolution by 
 
 23. Indeed, one commentator has defined ceremonial deism as “acts that have largely or 
totally lost their religious significance because of their passive character or their long-standing 
repetition in a civic context.” Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith? Religious-Secular 
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1772 (1993). Less common, 
but also relevant to the phenomenon of changed social meaning over time, are symbols or 
practices that have secular origins but have taken on religious meaning. One might argue that 
this is the case with Christmas trees or the entire symbology surrounding the Easter holiday. 
See, e.g., PENNE L. RESTAD, CHRISTMAS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 57 (1995) (“In pre-Christian 
times, Romans used evergreens, symbols of fertility and regeneration, to trim their houses at the 
Kalends [i.e., the first day] of January. Eventually, Christians appropriated the use of evergreens 
for their Christmas celebration. To remove the taint of paganism, they associated it with new 
beginnings and man’s second chance with God. The tree became for pious folk a representation 
of Jesus as the Light of the World, Tree of Life, and second Adam born to right the sins of the 
first.”). 
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the Supreme Court.24 Regardless of the particular doctrinal 
framework the Court adopts, resolution of future challenges will 
depend on an understanding of the social meaning of the practice at 
issue, and particularly on whether a phrase or practice may be 
understood to convey a religious message or to have lost that 
religious meaning. 
Part II then outlines one particular branch of linguistic theory, 
known as speech act theory, and sets forth several important elements 
of that theory as they apply to the problem of ceremonial deism and 
change in meaning over time.25 Speech act theory is a particularly 
useful instrument for analyzing ceremonial deism because, as 
explained in Part III, it is uniquely helpful for interpreting social 
meaning.26 With its emphasis on illocutionary force over propositional 
content, speech act theory emphasizes the effects of utterances over 
their literal meaning, much like the Supreme Court’s current 
Establishment Clause tests for determining the constitutionality of 
symbolic religious references. But unlike most court opinions on 
ceremonial deism, speech act theory has grappled carefully and 
thoroughly with the difficult problem of how those effects may be 
discerned, and with the effects on meaning of repetition and shifting 
political and historical contexts. Speech act theory does not change 
 
 24. Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that 
the Ninth Circuit’s prior opinion, which held the recitation of the Pledge in schools 
unconstitutional, is still binding because the Supreme Court reversed that decision on standing 
grounds but did not vacate it). This newest Pledge challenge is currently pending on appeal in 
the Ninth Circuit; oral argument was heard on December 4, 2007. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union 
Sch. Dist., No. 05-17344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4, 2007). The same plaintiff, Michael Newdow, 
has also brought suit in the Eastern District of California, challenging the constitutionality of 
the national motto. Newdow, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1075–76. Given that there was binding Ninth 
Circuit precedent holding the motto constitutional, Aronow, 432 F.2d at 244, the claim was 
dismissed, but an appeal of that case is also pending in the Ninth Circuit. Newdow v. Cong. of 
the U.S., No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4, 2007). Oral argument was heard on the same 
date as the argument in the Pledge case. Similarly, in December 2008, Newdow filed a complaint 
challenging the use of the phrase “So help me God” in the presidential inauguration. Newdow’s 
request for a preliminary injunction was denied on January 16, 2009, Newdow v. Roberts, No. 
08-02248, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2009), and an appeal is pending, Newdow v. Roberts, No. 
09-5126 (D.C. Cir. appeal docketed Apr. 9, 2009). 
 25. In drawing on theories of language, and in particular on a branch of the philosophy of 
language known as speech act theory, I am continuing a project I began with an earlier article 
on religious symbolism and the problem of context, which is to apply the insights of speech act 
theory to problems of social meaning in constitutional law. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious 
Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 
passim (2005). 
 26. See id. at 512–14. 
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the doctrinal analysis to be applied to religious references, but rather 
provides a methodology for answering the questions that courts 
already ask in such cases. 
Thus, Part II begins by introducing the concept of illocutionary 
effect, which is perhaps the central contribution of speech act theory. 
It then describes some of the central characteristics of speech acts, 
including their conventionality and the requirement of uptake. It also 
explains the inherent tension that arises from the conventionality of 
speech acts, by which meaning is both vulnerable and surprisingly 
persistent. 
Part III considers the doctrinal implications of this theory. First, 
it explains why speech act theory is particularly relevant to the 
problem of ceremonial deism, and second, it outlines a basic doctrinal 
test, drawing on the principles of speech act theory, that courts should 
use when deciding the permissibility of an instance of ceremonial 
deism under the Establishment Clause. In particular, this Article 
argues that courts should be skeptical of the “secularization” claim 
and, to reflect this skepticism, should adopt a rebuttable presumption 
of enduring religious meaning when confronted with constitutional 
challenges to instances of ceremonial deism. After describing how this 
rebuttable presumption might work in practice, Part III concludes 
with some examples. 
I.  CEREMONIAL DEISM AND THE SECULARIZATION THESIS 
The case law dealing with the constitutionality of ceremonial 
deism has been less than satisfying from a doctrinal standpoint. 
Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue head-on, 
it has suggested in dicta that various forms of ceremonial deism are 
constitutional. The Court’s reasoning has been notably sparse, 
however, and the lower courts have largely followed suit in that 
regard. 
Scholarly commentators have discussed the problem at 
somewhat greater length. Nonetheless, as discussed below, none of 
the analyses get to the heart of the problem. In the next Part, I argue 
that theories of language—and particularly theories about how 
meaning can change—might provide some new insight into the 
problem of ceremonial deism. But first, this Part expands on the case 
law upholding or suggesting the constitutionality of several different 
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instances of ceremonial deism and elucidates the secularization 
theory behind those cases.27 
A. The Secularization Thesis 
The origins of the secularization thesis—the notion that some 
phrases or practices may be constitutional because they have lost 
their religious meaning over time—are not entirely clear. The thesis 
has made an appearance in a number of Supreme Court cases, but 
most of those did not directly adjudicate challenges to brief official 
religious references. In addition, the secularization thesis has usually 
appeared in those cases without explanation and alongside other 
more compelling rationales. Lower courts have nonetheless seized on 
the thesis in disposing of challenges to ceremonial deism. 
Somewhat inexplicably, courts analyzing ceremonial deism often 
rely on the sui generis case Marsh v. Chambers,28 in which the Court 
considered the constitutionality of Nebraska’s practice of starting 
legislative sessions each day with a prayer led by a chaplain paid by 
the state. In upholding the practice of legislative prayer in Marsh, the 
Court did not apply any of the usual tests that it applies in other 
Establishment Clause cases, but rather somewhat departed from its 
precedent in reasoning that “history and tradition” support the 
constitutionality of the practice.29 In an opinion that even Justice 
Brennan’s dissent characterized as “narrow and, on the whole, 
careful,”30 Chief Justice Burger pointed out various unique 
characteristics of legislative prayer: that the practice dates back to 
colonial times; that the First Congress engaged in the practice; that it 
has continued without interruption ever since; and that most other 
states have also engaged in the practice for an extended period of 
time.31 This “unique history” led the Court to decide that the practice 
was constitutional, while implying that the analysis was not likely to 
have much application beyond the specific practice of legislative 
 
 27. For another description (and criticism) of the secularization thesis, see generally 
Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (1998). Furth defines 
secularization as “the Supreme Court’s determination that practices and symbols which were 
once religious have lost their religious significance, through either temporal or contextual 
erosion.” Id. at 584. 
 28. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 29. Id. at 786. 
 30. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 787–91 (majority opinion). 
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prayer.32 The Court also suggested that the practice was a mere 
“acknowledgement” of the importance of religion in American 
society and has become part of the “fabric of our society.”33 
As one commentator noted, despite its narrow drafting, Marsh 
has been read in a number of ways: “as grandfathering long-
established customs”;34 as “a standard for what the Establishment 
Clause must be thought to allow,”35 based on “historical practices and 
understandings”;36 and as “an illustration of how repetition can 
secularize what might otherwise be considered religious.”37 The Third 
Circuit recently echoed the last of those interpretations when it 
argued that Marsh stood for “the proposition that history can 
transform the effect of a religious practice.”38 
A conceptual predecessor to Marsh is McGowan v. Maryland,39 
decided twenty-two years earlier. In McGowan, the Supreme Court 
held that Sunday closing laws did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because, although their original purpose was primarily to 
facilitate Sunday Sabbath worship (which was often enforced by law), 
 
 32. Id. at 791. For an excellent critique of the Court’s reasoning in Marsh, and particularly 
its claim that legislative prayer, at least on the congressional level, was uncontroversial 
throughout its long history, see generally Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009). 
 33. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 34. Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild 
Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 574 (2007). 
 35. Id. at 575. 
 36. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 37. Strasser, supra note 34, at 574–75. 
 38. Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2003). Just one year 
after Marsh, the Court cited Marsh but applied a slightly different approach to uphold the 
constitutionality of a Christmas display in a public park that was maintained by the city of 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Chief Justice Burger 
stated, “There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of 
government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.” Id. at 674. Then, after 
cataloging the abundance of “official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance 
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders,” the 
Chief Justice’s majority opinion concluded that the crèche display merely “depict[ed] the 
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday” and was 
therefore “no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Congressional and 
Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as ‘Christ’s Mass,’ or the exhibition of 
literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.” Id. at 675–78, 
680, 683. In Lynch, the Court purported to apply the so-called Lemon test, in which a court 
considers whether the purpose and effect of the government’s actions are religious or secular, as 
well as whether there is excess administrative entanglement of religion and state. Id. at 680–85. 
 39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
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their purpose had become simply to permit a universal day of rest.40 
Thus, the Court held that the laws, which appeared under the title 
“Sabbath Breaking” and forbade “profan[ing] the Lord’s day,” did 
not constitute an establishment of religion even though they were 
“undeniably religious in origin.”41 The Court’s analysis relied in part 
on the history of Sunday closing laws, including the numerous 
changes in the language and structure of those laws that suggested 
they had evolved.42 
This analysis was supplemented by a lengthier historical exegesis 
by Justice Frankfurter, who acknowledged in a concurring opinion 
that the laws have been “the vehicle of mixed and complicated 
aspirations,”43 but agreed that they were constitutional despite their 
facially religious language and original intent.44 The religious language 
notwithstanding, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that “[c]ultural 
history establishes not a few practices and prohibitions religious in 
origin which are retained as secular institutions and ways long after 
their religious sanctions and justifications are gone.”45 Although 
McGowan’s language focused on the point in time at which the 
purpose of a statute is relevant—holding that the Court would 
consider the current purpose for keeping the statute rather than the 
original purpose for adopting it—its analysis invokes, and is 
sometimes used to support, the notion that religious meaning may be 
lost over time.46 
On the whole, though, the Supreme Court has shown no great 
appetite for addressing the constitutionality of ceremonial deism. In 
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,47 it famously dodged a 
squarely presented question regarding the constitutionality of the 
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance by turning the case 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 445–46. McGowan also stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause 
is not implicated by the mere fact that a rule of law “happens to coincide or harmonize with the 
tenets of some or all religions.” Id. at 442. 
 42. Id. at 431–40, 448–49. 
 43. Id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 459–95. 
 45. Id. at 503–04. 
 46. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 742 n.5 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting); Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 47. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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away on standing grounds.48 Nonetheless, three Justices in concurring 
opinions expressed their view that the Pledge was constitutional.49 
These opinions considered such factors as the lack of coercion,50 the 
long history of official acknowledgements of religion,51 and the brief, 
nondenominational nature of the reference to God.52 
A recurring theme in the Newdow concurrences, however, was 
that the Pledge was a patriotic rather than religious exercise. For 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, after cataloging the 
multiple references to God in various historic national documents, 
not only that “our national culture allows public recognition of our 
Nation’s religious history and character” but also that the Pledge “is a 
patriotic exercise, not a religious one.”53 Because “[t]he phrase ‘under 
God’ is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion, but 
a simple recognition of the fact . . . that our Nation was founded on a 
fundamental belief in God,” he continued, “participants promise 
fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith, or 
church.”54 Similarly, Justice O’Connor characterized the words 
“under God” as “merely descriptive” and patriotic rather than 
devotional.55 Indeed, citing McGowan, Justice O’Connor asserted that 
“[w]hatever the sectarian ends its authors may have had in mind, our 
continued repetition of the reference . . . in an exclusively patriotic 
context has shaped the cultural significance of that phrase to conform 
to that context. Any religious freight the words may have been meant 
to carry originally has long since been lost.”56 
The remaining Supreme Court discussions of the 
constitutionality of brief official religious references have appeared in 
passing dicta. For instance, Justices have referred to the national 
motto, presidential Thanksgiving proclamations, the Pledge, and 
 
 48. Id. at 4; cf. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 224 
(2004) (“In Newdow, it may have been politically impossible to affirm [the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that the pledge was unconstitutional] and legally impossible to reverse.”). 
 49. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 33 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 50. Id. at 43–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 46–49 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 51. Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 52. Id. at 42–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 53. Id. at 30–31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 54. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
 55. Id. at 40–41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 56. Id. at 41. 
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invocations like “so help me God” in the presidential oath and “God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” among others, as 
apparently constitutional examples of official religious 
acknowledgements, either to support their view that other, usually 
more novel instances of official religious speech are constitutional,57 
or to contrast these examples with other instances of official religious 
speech that they view as unconstitutional.58 In so doing, the Justices 
have invoked the history and ubiquity of these references,59 or have 
opined that the references have lost their religious meaning over time 
through rote repetition.60 For example, in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, which involved a challenge to public displays of a crèche and 
a menorah, Justice O’Connor suggested that the Thanksgiving 
holiday, “despite its religious origins, is now generally understood as a 
celebration of patriotic values rather than particular religious 
beliefs.”61 And in the same case, a majority of the Justices assumed, 
largely without explanation, that a Christmas tree is at least 
sometimes a secular symbol.62 Finally, concurring in School District of 
 
 57. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887–93 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 29–30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 35–37, 36 n.* 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 624–
25 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 670–74 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 88 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676–77 (1984); 
id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1952). 
 58. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 716 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492 
U.S. at 602–03; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303–04 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 78 n.5 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan claimed, beginning in Marsh, to be 
uncertain about the constitutionality of ceremonial deism but insisted in Marsh that legislative 
prayer was unconstitutional. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 813, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing the crèche to 
more acceptable references to God in the national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 59. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 624–25 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 60. Id. at 631; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 713–17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303–04 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 61. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631. That the origins of the holiday are religious may be shown 
by the fact that both Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson resisted issuing Thanksgiving 
proclamations, and James Madison expressed regret that he had done so, all on constitutional 
grounds. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 53–60, 504–06; Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 
775–76. 
 62. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616; id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by 
Justices Marshall and Stevens) (allowing that “the tree alone may be deemed predominantly 
secular,” even if it is not secular when placed next to a menorah). 
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Abington Township v. Schempp,63 Justice Brennan cited McGowan v. 
Maryland to suggest that some apparently innocuous religious 
references might be justified as “activities which, though religious in 
origin, have ceased to have religious meaning.”64 According to Justice 
Brennan, they simply constitute recognition of “the historical fact that 
our Nation was believed to have been founded ‘under God.’”65 
Lower courts have had more occasions to address the 
constitutionality of various forms of ceremonial deism head-on. 
Again, however, very little sustained reasoning has supported these 
holdings. Some courts apply one of the standard doctrinal tests to 
determine the constitutionality of a challenged practice, whereas 
others, like the Supreme Court, do not apply any particular test.66 
Moreover, despite its narrow drafting, Marsh is often invoked to 
support the notion that a long history may remove any otherwise 
constitutionally problematic association with religion.67 
Challenges to the national motto have failed largely on the 
ground that the motto has secular purposes and effects, in that it is 
considered to be a patriotic or solemnizing phrase rather than a 
religious one. This reasoning is often accompanied by the suggestion 
that the phrase’s religious origins have been lost through “historical 
usage and ubiquity.”68 Turning away one such challenge, the Ninth 
 
 63. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 64. Id. at 303–04 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 304. 
 66. The test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), or a variant thereof, is 
usually applied by courts in such cases. According to that test, “the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; . . . its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion . . . [and] the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Marsh 
in rejecting a challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in the public schools); Doe 
v. La. Supreme Court, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18803, at *18–19 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1992) (citing 
Marsh in rejecting a challenge to the words “in the year of our Lord” on Louisiana law licenses 
and notarial commissions); cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (noting, in a 
constitutional challenge to the property tax exemption for churches, that “no one acquires a 
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use,” but that an “unbroken 
practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside”); Jeremy G. Mallory, Comment, An Officer 
of the House Which Chooses Him, and Nothing More: How Should Marsh v. Chambers Apply to 
Rotating Chaplains, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1431 (2006) (noting that many of the cases citing or 
discussing Marsh do not involve legislative chaplains). 
 68. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996); O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. 
Supp. 19, 20 (W.D. Tex. 1978); see also Justin Brookman, Note, The Constitutionality of the 
Good Friday Holiday, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 217–24 (1998) (discussing the phenomenon of 
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Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that “[i]t is not easy to discern 
any religious significance attendant the payment of a bill with coin or 
currency on which has been imprinted ‘In God We Trust’ or the study 
of a government publication or document bearing that slogan. In fact, 
such secular uses of the motto was [sic] viewed as sacrilegious and 
irreverent by President Theodore Roosevelt.”69 The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, addressing a challenge to a Christmastime nativity 
scene that included a large lighted Latin cross in ACLU of Illinois v. 
City of St. Charles,70 described an extensive catalog of symbols and 
terms that have “lost [their] religious connotations for most 
people”—including Christmas trees and wreaths, the five-pointed star 
of Bethlehem, and the city names of Santa Cruz and even St. Charles 
itself.71 And in what might be considered the high-water mark of 
secularization claims, the Ninth Circuit declared that Hawaii’s Good 
Friday holiday passed constitutional muster, in part because it had 
partly lost its religious effect during the fifty years that it had been 
recognized.72 
Some opinions evidence a more nuanced approach to the 
problem of change in meaning over time, suggesting that the passage 
of time is simply one factor that a court must take into account when 
determining whether a government action unconstitutionally 
advances religion. In Freethought Society v. Chester County,73 the 
court considered and ultimately turned away an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a Ten Commandments display that had been placed on 
the exterior of a county courthouse eighty-two years earlier.74 The 
display, which had never been removed or maintained since its 
erection, was situated beside an entrance that had become defunct.75 
While rejecting the notion that the display’s age alone could 
immunize it from constitutional infirmity, the court insisted that 
historical context was one consideration in determining whether the 
 
secularization in the context of the Good Friday holiday, and attempting to set out factors for 
determining whether secularization has occurred). 
 69. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 70. ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 71. Id. at 271–72. 
 72. Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 n.19 (9th Cir. 1991). The court did allow that 
the holiday had not become “‘secularized’ in the same manner as Thanksgiving and Christmas,” 
by which the court apparently meant that the holiday had not been secularized to the same 
extent. Id. 
 73. Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 74. Id. at 249–51. 
 75. Id. at 253–54. 
HILL IN FINAL 12/1/2009  6:11:56 PM 
722 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:705 
display had an impermissible purpose or effect under the 
“endorsement test.”76 For the Freethought court, the relevance of the 
passage of time was not that it destroyed the religious significance 
originally carried by the Ten Commandments, but rather that the 
maintenance of the historic Ten Commandments plaque did not send 
the same message as a recently erected Ten Commandments plaque.77 
The court drew an analogy to both the national motto and the 
expression “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” 
which—though they contain religious language—have been 
“tempered by the secular meaning that has emerged over the passage 
of time” and by their use for secular purposes, such that “the 
reasonable person would not perceive in these phrases a government 
endorsement of religion.”78 In other words, while acknowledging the 
religious content of the plaque itself, the court found that the passage 
of time dulled any endorsement effect.79 
Thus, despite its questionable pedigree and analytical backing, 
courts often rely reflexively on the secularization thesis in dealing 
with challenges to official religious references. When upholding such 
a reference against constitutional challenge, a court’s reliance on the 
 
 76. Id. at 260 & n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the endorsement test, 
courts consider “whether ‘a reasonable observer would view [the government action] . . . as a 
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.’” Id. at 257 (quoting County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)). Although the endorsement test has been the dominant mode of evaluating 
Establishment Clause challenges to symbolic and other primarily communicative government 
actions, the Court has strayed from this test recently, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 
(2005) (plurality opinion) (declining to apply the Lemon/endorsement test in favor of a 
consideration of “the nature of the monument and . . . our Nation’s history”), and well may 
abandon it altogether soon, see infra Part II.C. 
 77. Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 265. 
 78. Id. at 264; see also Eliott M. Berman, Note, Endorsing the Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Endorse Endorsement, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 17–18 (1990) (“[W]hen a reasonable 
observer judges a government action, the tradition or novelty of the act is central to his or her 
analysis. . . . To be sure, history lacks the power to turn a blatant message of endorsement into 
thin air. . . . However, when the Court enters a difficult area and considers statutes that are on 
the borderline of constitutionality, it is quite understandable why, under the endorsement test, 
the history of the statute and of the public’s perception of government regulation in the area at 
issue become significant elements of the Court’s establishment clause analysis.”); Brookman, 
supra note 68, at 216–24 (arguing that the concept that religious symbols, holidays, and phrases 
have been secularized over time “might be better understood as an argument that 
the . . . endorsing value has been lost over time”). I have made a similar suggestion elsewhere. 
Hill, supra note 25, at 524–26 (discussing “historical context” as one aspect of the context courts 
take into account when determining whether a religious display violates the Establishment 
Clause). 
 79. Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 262–70. 
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secularization thesis often accompanies an assertion that the 
challenged phrase does no more than acknowledge or describe the 
role of religion in the nation’s history.80 Courts make such arguments 
whether or not they are applying one of the standard Establishment 
Clause tests.81 Given the frequency with which the concept of change 
in meaning over time is invoked, it is surprising that so little 
theoretical content is supplied to support the claim.82 
B. Criticisms of the Secularization Thesis 
By and large, commentators have been critical of the notion that 
phrases or practices that are originally or facially religious can simply 
lose their religious meaning over time. Speaking specifically of Justice 
O’Connor’s espousal of this notion in the context of religious 
symbols, Professor Alan Brownstein has pointed out that the theory 
has been largely unexplained, and like others, he has questioned the 
accuracy of the claim. “Religious icons have remained powerful 
symbols for centuries despite their familiarity,” he argues; moreover, 
other types of symbols are not generally alleged to lose their meaning 
over time.83 Judge Manion of the Seventh Circuit has similarly 
criticized the concept of ceremonial deism. Like Professor 
Brownstein, he questions why “only religious phrases” may “los[e] 
their significance through rote repetition”: “Why only ‘under God’? 
Why not ‘indivisible’, ‘liberty and justice for all’? Do not these 
equally repeated phrases also lose their meaning under the logic of 
‘ceremonial deism’?”84 Similarly, Professor Douglas Laycock and 
 
 80. The secularization thesis also implies that certain phrases or practices may have been 
Establishment Clause violations at the time their usage commenced but, left unchallenged, 
become constitutional over time. 
 81. Compare, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 778–80 (9th Cir. 1991) (deploying the 
secularization thesis while applying the Lemon test), with Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 
242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (claiming, in rejecting a challenge to the national motto, that the motto 
is secular or patriotic rather than religious, without applying any particular test). 
 82. One commentator traces the secularization phenomenon to the concept of “civil 
religion,” first described by Robert Bellah. Furth, supra note 27, at 596–600. 
 83. Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality: 
Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 837, 853 (2001). 
 84. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., 
concurring); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[R]epetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional meaning. Words 
like ‘God’ are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each successive 
utterance.”). It is possible, of course, that “indivisible” and “liberty and justice for all” have, in 
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others have forcefully argued that the words “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance have “obvious religious meaning,” as evidenced 
by the fact that believers and nonbelievers alike find religious content 
in the phrase.85 
In addition to questioning the factual accuracy of the claim that 
religious meaning disappears over time, commentators have 
emphasized the conceptual and theoretical difficulties that arise from 
this approach. One prevalent argument is that it is denigrating to 
religion and insulting to religious believers and nonbelievers alike to 
say that the Christmas holiday, the national motto, and the like have 
no religious content. Justice Brennan, for example, has forcefully 
asserted that the suggestion that a crèche is 
merely “traditional” and therefore no different from Santa’s house 
or reindeer is not only offensive to those for whom the crèche has 
profound significance, but insulting to those who insist for religious 
or personal reasons that the story of Christ is in no sense a part of 
“history” nor an unavoidable element of our national “heritage.”86 
 
fact, lost their meaning and force through this same logic, but if so, that fact would have little 
relevance to the Establishment Clause analysis. 
 85. Laycock, supra note 48, at 224–27; see also Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance 
and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 48 (2003) (“[I]t is simply untrue for many 
people that ‘under God’ has lost its religious meaning. If the phrase had lost its meaning, it is 
unlikely that so many people would be so angry about taking it out of the Pledge.”); Daniel O. 
Conkle, Religious Expression and Symbolism in the American Constitutional Tradition: 
Governmental Neutrality, but Not Indifference, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 417, 433 (2006) 
(“By all indications, the governmental expression in question does promote and endorse 
religion, and it does so deliberately.”); Epstein, supra note 3, at 2165–66 (“[U]nder any honest 
appraisal of modern American society, the practices constituting ceremonial deism have not lost 
their religious significance. For instance, it would probably come as a great surprise to most 
Christians that religion is no longer a significant component of the Christmas holiday. . . . And 
although oaths, the judicial invocation, ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the 
national motto seem fairly innocuous at first blush, they pack a powerful religious punch to both 
the most and the least devout members of the American population.”); Steven H. Shiffrin, The 
Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 69 (2004) (“Citizens may 
have forgotten that the City of Los Angeles has a religious meaning, but any English speaker 
knows that ‘under God’ and ‘In God We Trust’ carry theological meaning.”). 
 86. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 712 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Laycock, 
supra note 48, at 224–27, 233 (noting that the secularization of “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance is unacceptable to believers and nonbelievers alike); Robert A. Schapiro, The 
Consequences of Human Rights Foundationalism, 54 EMORY L.J. 171, 179 (2005) (noting that 
including “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance requires one to “affirm a deity in which one 
does not actually believe” and that to treat the reference to God as meaningless “would be 
insulting to those who take references to God quite seriously”); Shiffrin, supra note 85, at 68–69 
(describing the argument as “ironic”); Steven D. Smith, How Is America “Divided by God”?, 27 
MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 155 (2007) (arguing that “[s]uch explanations . . . demean the expressions 
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Another prominent critique challenges the Court’s approach of 
carving out a sort of de minimis exception to Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence for ceremonial deism.87 Professor Laycock, for example, 
has critiqued that exception on the grounds that it is standardless: 
although it appears to exempt a small class of practices from 
traditional Establishment Clause standards, the Court has given no 
guidance as to what, if any, other practices or symbols may join the 
“short list” of acceptable Establishment Clause violations; at least as 
currently formulated, the de minimis exception for ceremonial deism 
is a “standardless rule” that is “subject to manipulation.”88 Similarly, 
Professor William Van Alstyne has noted that the logic and 
standardless nature of the de minimis exception lead courts to apply a 
new Establishment Clause test: an “any more than” test.89 According 
to this “test,” courts simply consider whether a challenged practice 
advances religion any more than practices that the government has 
constitutionally engaged in previously.90 Of course, the answer to that 
question is largely “in the eye of the beholder.”91 Such amorphous and 
 
and insult the intelligence”); Furth, supra note 27, at 600–04 (describing how secularization of 
religious symbols and language denigrates religion, offends both believers and nonbelievers, and 
creates schisms within society); cf. Cammack, 932 F.2d at 790 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating 
that it is “distasteful to practicing Christians” to compare the serious occasion of Good Friday 
with the “mirth and levity” of Christmas and Thanksgiving). 
 87. E.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 2166–69; Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the 
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 521 
(1992); Laycock, supra note 48, at 227–29, 231. 
 88. Laycock, supra note 48, at 232, 239–40. But see Conkle, supra note 85, at 435 (arguing 
that “there is an implicit exception to the Supreme Court’s customary Establishment Clause 
doctrine” but that it is “limited to a select group of governmental practices that are historical, 
symbolic, and nonsectarian in nature; and that the exception is the product of a distinctive blend 
of constitutional values”). 
 89. Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 782–83; see also Epstein, supra note 3, at 2167–68 
(discussing Van Alstyne’s “any more than” test and noting its problematic appearance in a case 
upholding the constitutionality of the Good Friday holiday as similar to the Thanksgiving and 
Christmas holidays). 
 90. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 782–83 (describing the “‘any more than’ test”). 
 91. Epstein, supra note 3, at 2167, 2168 n.474. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in ACLU of Ohio 
v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001), presents a salient 
example of this “any more than” logic. In evaluating the constitutionality of the Ohio state 
motto, “With God, All Things Are Possible,” id. at 291, which is a direct quote from the New 
Testament, the court reviewed the wide variety of religious sentiments that had been expressed 
in official fora and that apparently had been viewed as constitutionally acceptable, id. at 293–
300, before simply concluding that “[j]udged by historical standards, adoption of the motto no 
more represents a step toward an establishment of religion than does our own practice of 
opening each session of court with a crier’s recitation of the set piece that concludes—in words 
also called out in the United States Supreme Court each day that Court sits—‘God save the 
United States and this Honorable Court,’” id. at 300. 
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manipulable arguments are not easy to refute, largely because of—
not despite—the lack of logical reasoning supporting them.92 
This Article acknowledges and accepts those criticisms, and at 
the same time attempts to take seriously the notion that meaning can 
change over time. In particular, it draws on the intuition that some 
religious references—such as the city names of San Francisco, Corpus 
Christi, and St. Louis—can fairly be said to have lost their religious 
impact over time, whereas other phrases or symbols—such as “under 
God” in the Pledge, “In God We Trust,” and Christmas trees—are 
more controversial. The goal of this Article is thus to consider 
whether and how a line may be drawn among various instances of 
ceremonial deism on the ground that some facially religious terms or 
practices have lost religious meaning. 
In particular, this Article argues that both the way courts have 
used the secularization claim and many of the ways in which 
commentators have critiqued it rely on an incomplete understanding 
of how language works. Linguistic theory can lead to a more nuanced 
evaluation of the secularization claim and the circumstances in which 
it may or may not apply. In particular, this more nuanced 
understanding will provide some theory with which to both support 
and critique a heretofore untheorized shibboleth underlying a largely 
subjective determination. At a minimum, a theoretical framework for 
understanding change in meaning over time can obviate or minimize 
the criticism that courts have simply carved out an exception to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for certain forms of ceremonial 
deism, thus distorting the doctrine and opening the way for 
standardless application. But perhaps more importantly, as explained 
further in Part III, linguistic theory provides much reason to doubt 
the validity of the secularization claim as it is made in many cases. 
 
 92. Finally, some critics have pointed out that there is an internal inconsistency in changed-
meaning arguments, as “[s]uch an approach implies that phrases like ‘in God we trust’ or ‘under 
God’ when initially used on American coinage or in the Pledge of Allegiance, violated the 
establishment clause because they had not yet been rendered meaningless by repetitive use,” 
though they may be constitutional now. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 
448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., concurring); see also Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 
F.3d 395, 405 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that many Justices have followed changed-meaning 
arguments in acknowledging ceremonial deism, but that ceremonial deism, as a theory, is 
internally inconsistent). 
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C. Ceremonial Deism in the Context of Establishment Clause 
Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has embraced numerous tests in the 
Establishment Clause area, and it is often a guessing game to 
determine which test will apply to a particular controversy. In the 
Newdow case, for example, the two principal merits briefs combined 
used no fewer than four different Establishment Clause tests in 
arguing for the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the words 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.93 Given this state of 
disarray, it is difficult to reason about the constitutionality of 
ceremonial deism within any fixed line of doctrine. This Section 
therefore attempts to place ceremonial deism into a clearer doctrinal 
framework—both briefly describing the various analytic tests that 
could be, and occasionally are, applied to ceremonial deism and 
explaining the relevance of this Article’s project to the overall 
doctrinal question of ceremonial deism’s constitutionality. 
The various tests actually reflect two levels of disagreement 
among the Justices of the Supreme Court. First, there is disagreement 
over the method for determining whether a religious message is 
conveyed at all by a particular instance of governmental speech. 
Various tests have different ways of answering that question, which I 
term the methodological question. Second, there is disagreement over 
the question of how much, if any, official religious expression is 
permissible under the Establishment Clause. I call this the substantive 
question. 
Courts have applied the Lemon/endorsement test, the coercion 
test, and the so-called Marsh test—along with some variations of 
those tests—to determine whether an instance of ceremonial deism is 
constitutional. According to the Lemon/endorsement test, the court 
must determine whether the government conduct is intended to 
convey, or has the effect of conveying, a message of religious 
endorsement—that is, whether it “sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
 
 93. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 24–45, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624); Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8–38, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 
02-1624). Petitioner Elk Grove’s brief applied the coercion test, the Marsh test, and the 
Lemon/endorsement test, and also noted the Supreme Court’s dicta on the topic. Respondent 
Newdow applied the neutrality test, the Lemon test, and the coercion test. The Court, however, 
officially adopted none of these tests, as it decided the case on prudential standing grounds. 
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favored members of the political community.”94 The court makes this 
determination by asking whether a reasonable observer, familiar with 
the history and context of the government practice at issue, would 
perceive such endorsement.95 
The coercion test, by contrast, asks only whether the challenged 
practice coerces participation in a religious exercise. The coercion test 
differs from the endorsement test in terms of the substantive issue of 
how much religious speech each is prepared to permit. The coercion 
test is ultimately somewhat more permissive than the endorsement 
test. At the same time, it is not clear that the two tests differ in their 
methodology—that is, in how they determine the meaning of 
government speech.96 
Finally, the poorly defined Marsh test appears to be 
methodologically and perhaps substantively distinct from both the 
Lemon/endorsement and coercion tests. The Marsh test looks to the 
history and ubiquity of a practice, sometimes together with the 
context of the particular challenged practice, to decide whether the 
practice violates the Establishment Clause. At the heart of Marsh is 
the view that a practice that has been engaged in without controversy, 
sufficiently often and for a sufficiently long time, is ipso facto 
inoffensive to the Establishment Clause. That view is often 
 
 94. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 95. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2000). Maddeningly, 
though, the Court declined to apply this test explicitly in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005), which was a challenge to a Ten Commandments display. Indeed, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion explicitly departed from the Lemon test and instead looked to 
history and tradition, applying something more akin to the Marsh test. Id. at 686–92 (plurality 
opinion). Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, which provided the necessary fifth vote, eschewed 
all tests and instead simply applied what he called “legal judgment.” Id. at 699–700 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” appeared to be the functional 
equivalent of the endorsement test, however. See generally Hill, supra note 25, at 496–502 
(discussing Justice Breyer’s opinion in Van Orden in relation to other cases applying the 
endorsement test and concluding that Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden was similar to the 
Court’s approach in those other cases). 
 96. Given the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—the creator and leading 
proponent of the endorsement test—in 2006, and her replacement by Justice Samuel Alito, most 
commentators agree that there are currently five votes on the Supreme Court to abandon the 
endorsement test and replace it with a “coercion” or “proselytizing” test. E.g., Gary J. Simson, 
Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 
379–80 (2006); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 647, 665–66 (2006) (noting that a majority of the Justices would now likely abandon the 
endorsement test); Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-
Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 149 (describing the endorsement test as being “in a 
precarious state” after the 2005 Decalogue cases). 
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accompanied by the assertion that the religious reference does no 
more than acknowledge or describe the beliefs of the Founders or the 
historic role of religion in the history of the nation.97 Marsh’s 
approach, especially to the extent that it implies that longstanding 
and ubiquitous practices have become secularized, is present in the 
way most courts deal with ceremonial deism.98 The concurring 
opinions in Newdow, for example, repeatedly used the words 
“describe,” “acknowledge,” and their synonyms in connection with 
the Pledge’s religious phrase.99 
The Marsh test thus may differ from the Lemon/endorsement 
and coercion tests primarily in its methodology—in how it determines 
whether a particular government practice is religious or secular100—or 
 
 97. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983). 
 98. See, e.g., Ashley M. Bell, Comment, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical 
Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1293 (2001) (“‘Secularization’ remains the 
Court’s justification for upholding the legitimacy of historical religious expressions and other 
overtly religious practices.” (footnote omitted)); Furth, supra note 27, at 585–93 (discussing the 
secularization approach taken by courts in a variety of cases). 
 99. E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Pledge itself is a patriotic observance focused . . . on . . . the 
description of the Nation. . . . [and] seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the 
Nation’s leaders.”); id. at 30 (“[O]ur national culture allows public recognition of our Nation’s 
religious history and character.”); id. at 31 (“[T]he phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge . . . is . . . a 
simple recognition of the fact . . . ‘that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in 
God.’” (quoting H.R. REP. 83-1693, at 2340 (1954))); id. at 33 (stating that “under God” is a 
“descriptive phrase”); id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the 
Pledge serves “to commemorate the role of religion in our history”); id. at 40 (“Even if taken 
literally, the phrase [‘under God’] is merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United 
States as a Nation subject to divine authority.”); see also Joan DelFattore, What Is Past Is 
Prelude: Newdow and the Evolution of Thought on Religious Affirmations in Public Schools, 8 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 641, 649–50 (2006) (describing how Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor characterized the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance as merely 
descriptive); cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation and 
Acknowledgement of Religion at Public Universities, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 939, 980–93 
(2008) (distinguishing three different types of acknowledgement—historical, reverential, and 
cultural—and arguing that only reverential acknowledgement is constitutionally problematic). 
 100. After a challenged practice is determined to be secular, the Establishment Clause 
inquiry is over. If a practice is determined under Marsh to be religious, the next question would 
presumably be whether it is nonetheless permissible under one of the other Establishment 
Clause tests. Because it is rare that the Marsh test leads a court to conclude that a challenged 
practice is, in fact, religious, it is not clear how courts are to determine the answer to that next 
question, however. Perhaps they must then apply the endorsement or coercion tests. That 
appears to be the view of two concurring Justices in Newdow. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 31 n.4 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (combining the coercion test and Marsh factors); 
id. at 34–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (combining the endorsement test and 
Marsh factors). 
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in its approach to the substantive question of how much religious 
speech is acceptable, suggesting that invocations of God, as in the 
Pledge and the motto, are constitutional because the Establishment 
Clause permits such expressions of religious belief.101 Because the 
Framers were themselves religious and often invoked God, they could 
not have meant for those practices to be unconstitutional. After all, 
those who wrote the First Amendment surely would not have 
preached religious freedom with one breath while violating that 
freedom in the next.102 In other words, rather than asserting that 
“‘[u]nder God’ [i]s [n]ot an [a]ffirmation of [r]eligious [b]elief,” it 
says, “‘[u]nder God’ [i]s an [a]ffirmation of [r]eligious [b]elief, and 
[t]hat’s [o]kay.”103 It is often unclear whether the Marsh approach 
differs from other tests methodologically or substantively or both, 
because courts may collapse the two questions when applying Marsh 
to ceremonial deism.104 
 
 101. In this latter incarnation, Marsh’s approach is sometimes referred to as the 
acknowledgement or accommodation argument, but it is different from the argument that mere 
acknowledgement of the role of religion in the nation’s history is not unconstitutional because it 
is not a religious message conveyed by the government. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 
980–82 (distinguishing among types of acknowledgement). 
 102. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984) (noting that the First Congress 
and the Congress of 1789 employed chaplains, but saw no constitutional violation in doing so); 
ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 2001) (“If 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had been understood by its authors to 
prohibit the government from expressing sentiments of the sort contained in the Ohio motto 
[‘With God All Things Are Possible’] . . . some of the behavior of the First Congress would have 
been utterly inexplicable.”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, 
McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST 
AMENDMENT L. REV. 59, 71–72 (2006) (describing “Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, and to some 
extent Kennedy” as subscribers to the view that “[g]overnment can purposely engage in the 
acknowledgement, preference, accommodation, even assistance of” monotheism); cf. Steven G. 
Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2006) 
(describing and critiquing this argument); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United 
States: Fin de Siècle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 309–11 (2000) (arguing that affirmation of certain 
monotheistic religious tenets is consistent with the American version of nonestablishment of 
religion). But see Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent down from the Mountain, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 287, 288 (arguing that “[a] better reading [of Scalia’s views] is that the 
government’s persistent acknowledgment of a generalized monotheism . . . provides merely a 
baseline against which to interpret the Establishment Clause . . . [which] does not freeze a 
preference for monotheism into the Establishment Clause itself, but rather defers to 
representative bodies the development of our traditions to include specific monotheistic 
religions, non-monotheistic religions, or atheism—or to end the tradition by opting for no 
government acknowledgment of religion at all”). 
 103. DelFattore, supra note 99, at 648, 653. 
 104. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (applying 
a “history and tradition” test similar to the Marsh test to determine that a Ten Commandments 
display either did not convey a religious message or was religious but not unconstitutional); 
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In essence, this Article assumes that “for now, the Court’s 
general approach continues to preclude the government from 
promoting religious expression” and therefore that any religious 
speech by the government will at least raise substantial Establishment 
Clause questions.105 The focus of this Article is thus on the 
methodological question, and specifically on how one is to determine 
whether the religiosity of a particular practice, symbol, or phrase has 
faded. This Article’s argument is thus relevant to either the 
endorsement test or the coercion test, which vary only in the 
substantive matter of the extent of government expression that is 
permissible. It could also function as a replacement for the Marsh 
test, which considers whether, in light of the ubiquity and long use of 
a practice, an instance of religious speech has become a mere 
recognition or description of the role of religion in the nation’s 
history. 
II.  SPEECH ACT THEORY, ITERABILITY, AND CHANGE IN MEANING 
OVER TIME 
So far, this Article has established that courts have not analyzed 
the constitutionality of brief official religious references, often 
referred to as ceremonial deism, in a thorough or nuanced way. 
Although courts and commentators sometimes assert that such 
references are unproblematic because they have lost their religious 
meaning over time or through repetition, these assertions are largely 
unsupported and undertheorized. Moreover, the notion that religious 
meaning can be lost over time has been criticized as factually 
inaccurate, logically incoherent, and overly subjective. This obviously 
problematic and much-maligned proposition—that meaning can 
change over time in ways that are relevant to Establishment Clause 
analysis—is the focus of this Article. 
This Article now turns to the branch of the philosophy of 
language known as speech act theory to consider the problem of 
change in meaning over time from a new perspective.106 This new 
 
Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445–48 (7th Cir. 1992) (conflating the 
methodological and substantive questions in determining whether the phrase “under God” in 
the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause). 
 105. Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in Governmental 
Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 316 (2007). 
 106. Although this Article occasionally refers to speech act theory as a branch of linguistic 
theory, the main theorists of speech acts, such as J.L. Austin and John Searle, situate themselves 
primarily in the field of analytic philosophy rather than linguistics. See, e.g., David Gorman, The 
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perspective will hopefully present a new way of thinking about a very 
old problem and particularly of attacking the thorny methodological 
problem of determining the “effect” or “social meaning” of brief 
official religious references, which courts—by simply declaring that 
some words may lose their religious meaning over time—have not 
done in a satisfactory way so far. This Part therefore briefly outlines 
the premises of speech act theory, some of its central characteristics, 
and its relevance to the problem of ceremonial deism. 
First, Part II.A elucidates the concept of illocutionary force, 
which is perhaps the central contribution of speech act theory. The 
idea of illocutionary force shifts the emphasis in interpretation from 
the propositional content of language to the actions it accomplishes—
in other words, its effects. It is thus particularly relevant to an 
Establishment Clause analysis of religious speech, because 
Establishment Clause doctrine is similarly concerned with the 
endorsing, coercing, or proselytizing effects of such speech. Part II.B 
then discusses the conventionality of speech acts, which is perhaps 
their most important characteristic. Part II.B.1 explains what it means 
to say that speech acts are conventional. Parts II.B.2 through II.B.4 
delineate some important consequences that flow from this 
conventionality. Finally, Part II.C discusses a final important 
characteristic of successful speech acts—the necessity of uptake. This 
Article does not pretend to give a comprehensive overview of speech 
act theory as a whole, of course; such an undertaking would be well 
beyond its scope. Rather, the Article’s goal is to give the reader a 
working familiarity with the most basic premises of that theory and to 
highlight those aspects of it that are most relevant to an 
understanding of ceremonial deism—namely, speech act theory’s 
emphasis on illocutionary force, its insight regarding the 
 
Use and Abuse of Speech-Act Theory in Criticism, 20 POETICS TODAY 93, 108–09 (1999). The 
theory has been influential in a number of fields, however—including linguistics—and a version 
of it has found a particularly strong foothold in literary theory. Other legal scholars have also 
discussed J.L. Austin and speech act theory, perhaps most notably in connection with free 
speech doctrine. See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 21, 121 n.31 (1993) 
(discussing speech act theory in connection with sexual speech); John Greenman, On 
Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1351–54 (2008) (discussing and critiquing the use of 
speech act theory in free speech scholarship). In addition, Professor Heidi Hurd has explicated 
the theory masterfully and at length in connection with statutory interpretation. Heidi M. Hurd, 
Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 passim (1990). 
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conventionality of speech acts, and its elucidation of the requirement 
of uptake.107 
A. Meaning and Illocutionary Force 
Speech act theory is a branch of the philosophy of language that 
considers how language actually works—and how and why it fails. 
Rather than considering language as an abstract means of conveying 
truth, speech act theory looks at language as it is used in everyday 
life, perceiving language primarily as doing rather than as 
describing—as bringing about states of affairs, with greater or lesser 
degrees of success, rather than simply referring to them.108 The 
founding father of speech act theory, J.L. Austin, was the first to 
identify and describe linguistic utterances in these terms.109 Initially, 
he considered speech acts, or “performatives,” as a class of utterances 
that bring about an effect by the mere fact of their utterance, such as 
“I do ( . . . take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)”; “I name 
this ship the Queen Elizabeth”; “I give and bequeath my watch to my 
brother”; and “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.”110 As Austin 
explains, “it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the 
appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing 
[something] . . . or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.”111 By 
speaking, one effects the act of marrying, christening a ship, 
bequeathing, and betting. 
Law works by means of such performative utterances in many 
cases, and it is easy to come up with other legal examples: imposing a 
prison sentence, enjoining a party from taking an action, and forming 
 
 107. Indeed, not all scholars would agree with my understanding of speech act theory. As is 
true of any substantial scholarly field, there is a large literature on the philosophy of language 
and no small amount of disagreement within that literature. 
 108. Hill, supra note 25, at 511–12. 
 109. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962). Austin’s 
theory of speech acts owes much to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, in particular his 
Philosophical Investigations. Austin’s work, however, is situated within a long history of 
preoccupation with the relationship between language and action in analytic philosophy. This 
preoccupation arguably can (like virtually every other intellectual endeavor) be traced back to 
Artistotle. See Barry Smith, Towards a History of Speech Act Theory, in SPEECH ACTS, 
MEANING AND INTENTIONS: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN R. 
SEARLE 29, 29–30 (Armin Burkhardt ed., 1990). 
 110. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF 
JUDGES 154–55 (1993) (describing speech acts). 
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a legally binding contract are also obvious performatives.112 Such 
performatives were to be contrasted in Austin’s theory with 
“constatives,” which merely report, state, or describe a state of 
affairs.113 
Importantly, however, over the course of Austin’s study he came 
to conclude that performatives were not in fact a unique class of 
utterances within language; rather, he ultimately concluded, the class 
of constative utterances is merely a subset of the performative.114 
After all, Austin explains, describing a state of affairs is doing 
something with words, just as much as christening and marrying and 
bequeathing and betting. “Surely to state is every bit as much to 
perform [a speech] act as, say, to warn or to pronounce,” and indeed, 
Austin admits that any criterion he can find to define a 
performative—such as that it must be either successful or 
unsuccessful, rather than true or false—applies no more or less to so-
called constatives than to performatives.115 Over the course of the 
series of lectures that came to be published as How to Do Things with 
Words, Austin’s analysis therefore shifted from distinguishing 
performatives from constatives to establishing that performative 
force, or what he referred to as illocutionary force, is a property of all 
utterances, to be distinguished from what he called locutionary 
force.116 
 
 112. Evidence scholars may be familiar with the concept of performatives, which are related 
to the “verbal acts doctrine,” involving statements that “affect[] the legal rights of the parties,” 
United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory 
committee’s note), and “have independent legal significance, such as contractual offers or inter 
vivos gifts,” id. (citing 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.11[3] (2d ed. 1997)); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. 
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1182 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between a statement that a party is 
willing to settle a case and an offer to settle a case, characterizing the latter as “what 
philosophers of language call a performative utterance, to which truth is irrelevant”). 
 113. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 6 n.2. 
 114. Id. at 147–48 (“Stating, describing, &c., are just two names among a very great many 
others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position.”); see also, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, 
ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 112–13 (1982) 
(discussing Austin’s analysis as leading to the conclusion that the constative is a special case of 
the performative). 
 115. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 133–39; see also Deirdre Wilson, Book Review, 88 MIND 
461, 461 (1979) (“Austin claimed that there could be no purely syntactic basis for the 
performative-constative distinction.”). 
 116. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 149; see also David Gorman, supra note 106, at 97 (“Austin 
expressly refutes the hypothesis of a constative/performative distinction . . . . The way in which 
he starts over is to introduce quite a different distinction, between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts.”); John R. Searle, Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts, 77 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 
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Indeed, the constative speech acts of stating, asserting, and 
describing may be considered acts in several senses. They are acts in 
the sense that they accomplish something specific and distinct that 
can be performed through the use of words. They share all of the 
qualities of speech acts, such as conventionality, iterability, and the 
necessity of uptake, described further below. And they are often also 
acts in the sense that they do more than passively observe or describe: 
they may also help to construct the reality that they describe or 
purport to describe. Descriptions and statements may have the effect 
not only of telling someone a truth, or explaining a reality to someone 
who is unfamiliar with that reality; they may also tend to reinforce 
those truths or realities by presenting them as fact rather than as one 
contested viewpoint among many. Indeed, this is precisely one 
objection of feminist scholars such as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine 
MacKinnon to pornography—it not only fantasizes but in some sense 
perpetuates women’s subjugation.117 Moreover, when the state—the 
voice of sovereign authority—engages in such speech acts, those 
speech acts may have a particularly strong tendency to create the 
reality they purport only to describe.118 
What one commonly thinks of as “meaning” therefore may be 
thought to include two different concepts: locutionary force and 
illocutionary force.119 The locutionary act may be roughly defined as 
“uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference”; 
locutionary force, therefore, “is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in 
the traditional sense.”120 One might also describe the locutionary force 
as the utterance itself, the literal or surface meaning of a particular 
combination of words. Illocutionary force, on the other hand, is the 
act (describing, sentencing, marrying, and so on) that is performed by 
 
405, 405 (1968) (“The main theme of Austin’s How to Do Things with Words is the replacement 
of the original distinction between performatives and constatives by a general theory of speech 
acts.”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 869–70 (2002) (discussing Austin’s shift 
from the constative-performative distinction to a new approach). 
 117. MACKINNON, supra note 106, at 11–31; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of 
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 946–47 (1995) (describing how government can 
construct social orthodoxy by adoption of specific stances on issues). 
 118. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 119. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 147. Austin also identified a third aspect of speech acts, 
perlocutionary force, id. at 108, which has garnered less attention than the other two. 
 120. Id. at 108; see also Hurd, supra note 106, at 955 (“When one invokes a sentence as one’s 
means of perfoming an illocutionary act, one performs what has come to be termed a 
‘locutionary act.’ One performs such a locutionary act whenever one utters a meaningful 
proposition about anything.” (footnote omitted)). 
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and in speaking. Every meaningful locutionary act is also an 
illocutionary act; locution and illocution are different aspects of the 
same speech act.121 
“One sign of there being a difference between locutionary and 
illocutionary acts is that it is possible to know what words were 
uttered with which senses and references but still to remain in doubt 
whether the illocutionary act was one of threat or advice or 
warning.”122 Jonathan Culler gives the example of the statement, 
“This chair is broken,” which may be an act of warning, informing, 
conceding, complaining, and so on.123 Although the literal, locutionary 
meaning of the sentence may be clear to the hearer, the illocutionary 
force of it may or may not. 
The so-called “Nuremberg Files” litigation presents an example 
of the locution-illocution distinction in the legal context. On appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit, the case largely centered on whether antiabortion 
posters identifying certain abortion providers and giving their home 
addresses, together with an antiabortion website, constituted a “true 
threat” that was unprotected by the First Amendment.124 The website 
listed names of abortion providers, which were struck through if the 
provider had been killed or grayed out if the provider had been 
wounded.125 Although the locutionary acts performed by the posters 
and websites may have been entirely clear, the nature of the 
illocutionary acts performed by the posters—whether they were acts 
of threatening, protesting, or informing—was hotly disputed, resulting 
in an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion that divided the judges six to 
five.126 
 
 121. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 98. John Searle has pointed out that, although locutionary 
and illocutionary are meaningfully different concepts, they are not mutually exclusive classes 
because sometimes the locutionary act is the same as the illocutionary act—as in the sentence, 
truthfully and correctly uttered, “I promise to do it.” The sense and reference of the sentence (I 
promise to do it) is the same as the sentence’s force (I have accomplished the act of promising to 
do it). Searle, supra note 116, at 407–08. 
 122. Gordon Bearn, Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically, DIACRITICS, Fall 1995, at 
3, 5 (citing AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 114 n.1). 
 123. CULLER, supra note 114, at 113. 
 124. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 125. Id. at 1063. 
 126. Id. (holding that the posters constituted a true threat). 
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B. Conventionality 
Speech act theory’s emphasis on illocutionary force has led 
theorists to ask what, exactly, determines the illocutionary force of a 
given utterance. The result has been the insight that speech acts are 
inherently conventional.127 This Section first explains how speech acts 
are conventional. It then extrapolates from that conventionality some 
consequences that are relevant to an analysis of ceremonial deism. 
1. The Conventionality of Speech Acts.  To be effective as a 
speech act, any meaningful statement must be uttered under the 
appropriate conditions. To take a straightforward example, the 
speech act of bequeathing possessions to an heir cannot be performed 
successfully unless certain conventions are met. Those conventions 
include the numerous formalities pertaining to wills under state law, 
such as signature and witness requirements; the requirement that the 
person doing the bequeathing have the legal authority to dispose of 
that property; and the requirement that the individual not be 
incompetent, under duress, performing in a play, or giving an 
example of performative utterances in a law review article when the 
words are uttered. But the words themselves—the locutionary act—
are also part of the conventionality of the speech act: although many 
different combinations of words may be used to bequeath one’s 
possessions, those words must still be recognizable to the relevant 
readers as words of bequest.128 The requirement that speech acts, to 
be successful, must be executed in the appropriate conventional 
circumstances applies not only to obviously performative acts such as 
sentencing, marrying, or christening but also to speech acts such as 
describing: to take an example, one cannot describe something 
successfully if one cannot observe it.129 
The conventionality of speech acts is one of its central features, 
and much of speech act theory is preoccupied with the task of 
isolating the conventions that are necessary for the success of 
 
 127. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 120 (“Illocutionary acts are conventional acts . . . .”). I have 
discussed the conventionality of speech acts elsewhere. Hill, supra note 25, at 512–15. 
 128. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 14–15 (“There must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further . . . . [t]he procedure must be 
executed by all participants both correctly and . . . completely.”). 
 129. See id. at 138. Austin describes other ways in which constative speech acts may be 
unsuccessful as well. Id. at 135–36. 
HILL IN FINAL 12/1/2009  6:11:56 PM 
738 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:705 
particular speech acts.130 Yet as described below in Part II.B.2, this 
conventionality is also precisely what allows words to mean different 
things when used in different contexts. The conventionality of 
language is both what allows it to produce meaning and what creates 
the potential for instability in that meaning.131 
2. Iterability, Speaker’s Intent, and the Vulnerability of Language.  
The iterability of language is one important consequence that flows 
from its inherent conventionality. If language is conventional, it must 
function according to a set of learnable, and thus reproducible, rules. 
The functionality of language depends, in other words, on its ability 
to be repeated—on the ability of certain speech acts to be replicated 
in a variety of contexts. This ability to be repeated, or “iterability,”132 
also means that any linguistic utterance is capable of being cut off 
from both its original context and its speaker’s intent to be 
reproduced in a context that may change or undermine its prior 
meaning. Indeed, no speech act could function at all if this were not 
the case—that is, if it were not both conventional and iterable. The 
conventionality and iterability of speech acts ensure that the speech 
act can be recognized, understood, and reproduced by different 
speakers and listeners, but they also ensure that language can be used 
in ways that may not have been originally intended.133 The inability of 
the original speaker’s intent to control the meaning of the speech act 
in the future makes it vulnerable to subversion. There are thus two 
consequences of the quality of iterability that inheres in all speech 
 
 130. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 25 
(1997) (discussing the importance of convention to meaning); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: 
AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 54–55 (1969) (describing such a project). 
 131. I have discussed in depth the problems caused by the dependence of meaning on 
context—another aspect of the conventionality that affects the success or failure of speech acts. 
Hill, supra note 25. I therefore do not cover that ground again here. 
 132. The notion of iterability, and its role in producing or changing meaning, belongs 
originally to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, 
in LIMITED INC 1, 18–19 (Gerald Graff ed., Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1988) 
[hereinafter Derrida, Signature Event Context]. Derrida’s argument about iterability, which is 
briefly described above, was the subject of a dispute between Derrida and John Searle, the 
essence of which is encapsulated in Derrida’s essay, id., Searle’s essay, John R. Searle, 
Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 1 GLYPH 198 (1977), and Derrida’s rather 
lengthy and emphatic response to Searle’s reply, Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc a b c . . ., in 
LIMITED INC, supra, at 29, 29–107 [hereinafter Derrida, Limited Inc]. 
 133. See generally CULLER, supra note 114, at 118–20 (“[A]n utterance can be meaningful 
only if it is iterable, only if it can be repeated in various serious and nonserious contexts, cited 
and parodied. Imitation is not an accident that befalls an original [utterance] but its condition of 
possibility.”). 
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acts: first, it makes successful speech acts possible, and second, it 
makes unsuccessful speech acts possible.134 
Jonathan Culler gives the example of the employer’s signature 
on a paycheck.135 A signature signifies the intention of the signer to 
endorse—that is, validate and stand behind—the document. To 
function as such, however, the signature must be repeatable and 
recognizable: it must be able to be copied, even by a machine. Thus, 
the electronically produced signature on the thousands of paychecks 
issued by large corporations can perform their function in the absence 
of any present intention on the part of any particular signor or any 
particular recipient.136 Indeed, the conventionality and thus 
reproducibility of the signature is precisely what opens it up to 
forgery—to being used not only in the absence of, but directly 
contrary to, the purported signatory’s intent.137 
Whatever the merits of this view for various other speech 
situations, its relevance for the sort of government speech involved in 
ceremonial deism seems inescapable.138 The fundamental quality of 
iterability is that it allows utterances to be meaningful when the 
speaker or the hearer, or both, are absent.139 Thus, the utterance must 
 
 134. Bearn, supra note 122, at 8. Bearn is summarizing Derrida here, and in doing so, Bearn 
espouses Derrida’s strong view that every speech act is not only potentially but actually 
“imperfect, incomplete, [and] unsuccessful.” Id. This is a version of the deconstructionist thesis 
regarding the indeterminacy of meaning. Without going into the details of that view or Bearn’s 
highly articulate defense of it, I will simply note that one need not accept the premise that all 
speech is always indeterminate to accept the argument set forth in this Article, as this Article 
does not rely on that stronger thesis. 
 135. CULLER, supra note 114, at 125–26. 
 136. See id. at 125–26 (“[I]terability, an essential feature of the structure of the signature, 
introduces as part of its structure an independence from any signifying intention. If the 
signature on a check corresponds to the model, the check can be cashed whatever my intentions 
at the moment of signature. . . . We can, fortunately, cash checks signed by a machine and 
receive a salary even though the signatory never saw the check nor entertained a specific 
intention to pay us the sum in question.”). Derrida nonetheless accepts the possibility of a 
“structural intentionality which is never anywhere present and which includes implications that 
never” entered the mind of any one individual. Id. at 127. 
 137. Likewise, Judith Butler notes that the term “queer” has been appropriated by the gay 
rights movement to the extent that it no longer has its original negative connotations. JUDITH 
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 223 (1993). 
 138. This view is also arguably relevant to the interpretation of statutes. See Hurd, supra 
note 106, at 951, 990. Professor Hurd argues that statutes are not “communicative” speech acts, 
in that they are not “communications by a sovereign speaker to an audience, the understanding 
of which depends upon the audience’s success at deciphering authorial intentions.” Id. at 951. 
 139. Bearn, supra note 122, at 6 (noting that Derrida introduces the concept of iterability 
“to name the power of written marks to function, that is, to be readable, in the absence of the 
receiver and in the absence of the sender”). 
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function “in the . . . absence of the receiver or of any empirically 
determinable collectivity of receivers,” and at the same time, “it must 
continue to ‘act’ and to be readable even when . . . the author of the 
writing no longer answers for what he has written . . . because he is 
dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his . . . present 
intention or attention . . . [to] what seems to be written in his 
name.”140 As Judith Butler puts it, “The Austinian subject speaks 
conventionally, that is, it speaks in a voice that is never fully 
singular. . . . Who speaks when convention speaks? In what time does 
convention speak? In some sense, it is an inherited set of voices, an 
echo of others who speak as the ‘I.’”141 
The conventional, plural, inherited nature of this speech thus 
greatly minimizes the importance of the intent or purpose behind it.142 
Indeed, Justice Samuel Alito recently made a similar observation in 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,143 in which the Court unanimously 
decided that the religious group Summum did not have a right to 
erect its monument in a public park alongside other monuments, 
including a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal 
Order of Eagles, because the permanent monuments in the park 
constituted government speech.144 While acknowledging that the 
government can usually be said to endorse the message contained in 
the monument, Justice Alito pointed out that monuments do not 
always express the original intent of their donors.145 Referring to a 
statue of Francisco “Pancho” Villa donated by the Government of 
Mexico to the city of Tucson, Arizona, for example, Justice Alito 
questioned whether it “commemorate[d] a ‘revolutionary leader who 
advocated for agrarian reform and the poor’ or ‘a violent bandit.’”146 
By accepting a monument, he noted, “a government entity does not 
necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor 
sees in the monument.”147 Moreover, Justice Alito explained, “people 
 
 140. Id. at 6 (quoting Derrida, Signature Event Context, supra note 132, at 7–8). 
 141. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 25. 
 142. Cf. Hill, supra note 25, at 514–15 (noting the relative lack of importance ascribed to 
subjective intent by speech act theory). 
 143. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 144. Id. at 1129. 
 145. Id. at 1135–36. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1136. 
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reinterpret the meaning of these memorials as historical 
interpretations and the society around them change[].”148 
Like the employer’s signature on a paycheck, many examples of 
ceremonial deism—city names, the national motto, the language of 
the Pledge, and even Christmas trees—function by means of this 
iterability; they function in the absence of any particular speaker or 
any particular intended hearer.149 The national motto on coins, for 
example, would be identifiable in general as government speech, but 
it is not identified with any individual speaker or any particular 
government in American history. Readers cannot honestly attribute 
those words to Abraham Lincoln, or Teddy Roosevelt, or the Sixtieth 
U.S. Congress. It is an “inherited set of voices” that speaks, echoing 
throughout history, which is strictly attributable only to a machine at 
the U.S. Mint.150 
Indeed, the motto itself demonstrates the importance of 
iterability as well as the role of iterability in making meaning 
vulnerable. The motto is recognizable as such because of the 
repetition of its exact phrasing and its placement on the coins. But at 
the same time, its repeatability, and thus its recognizability, is exactly 
what opens it up to new, and possibly ironic, use in other contexts—
such as the joke “In God we trust for the other eight cents.” The joke 
draws its humor from the way it trivializes the religious component of 
the motto, as well as the way in which it associates God and 
Mammon—an association that is latent but unexplored in the motto’s 
use on currency itself. It is legible, or comprehensible, only in terms 
of “the past from which it breaks”—that is, in terms of its religious 
origins.151 
Yet the possibility of resignification need not have application 
only when a phrase or term is used facetiously; other contexts that 
undermine or change the prior meaning of a term will function in the 
same way. Thus, for example, the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly,152 
arguing that the City of Pawtucket’s crèche display simply “depict[ed] 
 
 148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Cf. Hurd, supra note 106, at 968–81 (noting that statutes—another form of government 
speech—do not have intentional speakers or intended audiences in the usual, communicative 
sense). 
 150. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 25. 
 151. See id. at 14. Butler is speaking about hate speech and its reappropriation by 
subordinated groups, but there is no reason that this mechanism must be limited to hate speech. 
 152. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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the historical origins”153 of the Christmas holiday, analogized to the 
religious paintings, primarily Christian in their orientation, that hang 
in the National Gallery.154 The museum context invoked by the Court 
shows that the changed context can, in a sense, remove any religious 
meaning from the work of art. In other words, even if the artwork 
itself has deep religious meaning, its placement in the National 
Gallery does not suggest the illocutionary act of government 
endorsement of Christianity, but rather of depiction of religious 
events, or simply of visually “quoting” the artist’s religiously 
motivated expression.155 
3. The Persistence of Meaning.  Despite this vulnerability, 
illocutionary force at the same time possesses a surprising persistence. 
Judith Butler has argued that both past and future uses are, in a 
sense, contained within any single usage of a term, because 
iterability—which permits a vast variety of actual and possible usages 
of a given term, both “serious” and “nonserious”—is a necessary 
condition of successful speech acts.156 Thus, “[t]he illocutionary speech 
act” possesses a kind of “condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past 
and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that 
constitute and escape the instance of utterance.”157 Linguistic 
vulnerability thus opens up the possibility of “resignification,” by 
which language at least in part breaks with its prior contexts and prior 
usages by being used in new ways and new contexts;158 but at the same 
time, each time a term is used, it invokes its past usages and thus 
“reconsolidates” them, reminding the reader or listener of its 
historical meanings. 
For example, one might consider the word “Amen.” Translated 
and transliterated from Hebrew, the word “Amen” roughly means 
“so be it,” and is often used in or after prayers to express agreement 
or affirmation, with the implication that God has so willed. Because 
 
 153. Id. at 680. 
 154. Id. at 676–77. 
 155. Cf. id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] typical museum setting, though not 
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of 
that content.”). 
 156. Again, one need not accept Butler’s general critique or theory of language to accept its 
application to bureaucratic invocations of God and other instances of “speakerless” ceremonial 
deism discussed here. 
 157. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 3. 
 158. Id. at 13–15. 
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the word is iterable, however, it can be used in a variety of ways. 
Although not necessarily inherently religious, the word is 
recognizable as a religious affirmation when said in the context of a 
religious service. At the same time, it can be used in nonreligious 
contexts and lose its religious meaning—or even have the opposite 
meaning, perhaps when used ironically. One can imagine a 
conversation, for instance, in which a speaker, having proven the 
nonexistence of God, says, “And that is why God does not exist,” to 
which the sympathetic listener replies, “Amen.” It is because the 
second speaker has used the term “Amen” in a recognizable way, as 
an affirmation, following certain conversational conventions, that the 
usage is recognizable as such.159 Yet the word “Amen” is not being 
used in a religious way; in fact, it is used in precisely the opposite way. 
At the same time, the ironic impact of this usage can only arise 
because the speaker and listener are aware of the religious use to 
which the term is commonly put: the religious usages of the term 
inform the nonreligious usage and help produce its meaning. 
To take an example that presents the opposite dynamic, one 
might consider the case of State Board of Education v. Board of 
Education of Netcong,160 in which the New Jersey Superior Court 
upheld a constitutional challenge to one school district’s practice of 
beginning each school day with a reading of a portion of the 
Congressional Record containing one of the daily prayers delivered 
by the congressional chaplain.161 This case, which arose several years 
before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 
illustrates how the repetition of identical language in a new context 
may change its meaning. Indeed, one of the school board’s defenses 
in the case was that the readings were secular and therefore not 
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge.162 Yet in the school 
setting, the court found that the readings were indistinguishable from 
the sort of prayer that had recently been outlawed in Engel v. Vitale163 
and School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.164 Even if the 
court had espoused Marsh’s view that legislative prayer was of such 
long standing as to lose its religious force, it seems that reading the 
 
 159. For example, it would not be similarly comprehensible if the speaker instead had 
replied, “I amen disagree with you.” 
 160. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ. of Netcong, 262 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970). 
 161. Id. at 23. 
 162. Id. at 27. 
 163. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 164. Netcong, 262 A.2d at 30–31. 
HILL IN FINAL 12/1/2009  6:11:56 PM 
744 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:705 
identical prayers in schools, given the captive audience and the recent 
history of the Supreme Court’s decisions outlawing school prayer, 
would have an entirely different meaning. The repetition of the 
prayers in a new context thus revived any religious force that may 
have been minimized or eliminated in the congressional setting. 
On the one hand, then, each usage of a term (such as the word 
“Amen” or the national motto) invokes the history of the terms and 
their various contexts and usages—religious and nonreligious. On the 
other hand, though, the past usages of a term cannot continue to 
dictate its future meanings, and the possibility of resignification—
through presentation in a new context, or the willful act of the 
speaker, for example—always exists. Meaning is at once both 
vulnerable and surprisingly persistent. 
4. How Speech Acts Succeed Despite Their Vulnerability.  The 
preceding explanation illustrates that there is a certain tension in the 
citation or repetition of phrases or speech acts. Insofar as language 
sometimes both names and enforces certain norms—for example, the 
words “In God We Trust” purport to describe a fact about American 
society—the repetition and readoption of those words in various 
contexts reinforces the original strength of those norms. Yet at the 
same time, language is vulnerable; it cannot be completely efficacious 
in its enforcement of norms. Thus, “[s]uch norms are continually 
haunted by their own inefficacy.”165 This inefficacy leads to “the 
anxiously repeated effort to install and augment their jurisdiction.”166 
Indeed, because language is iterable and therefore partially open to 
change, any phrase—no matter how solemn—is always capable of 
being appropriated into a context that changes or subverts it.167 
Repetition of a phrase may accordingly be an effort to install or shore 
up the reality of which it appears to be merely a descriptive 
 
 165. BUTLER, supra note 137, at 237. 
 166. Id. at 237. Butler’s fascinating explanation for this phenomenon is that, because the 
sovereign power of the state is now “[d]iffused throughout disparate and competing domains of 
the state apparatus,” rather than consolidated in a single sovereign as it once was, “the historical 
loss of the sovereign organization of power appears to occasion the fantasy of its return . . . in 
the figure of” the sovereign—and hence always efficacious—performative. Thus, language is 
established “as a displaced site of politics . . . driven by a wish to return to a simpler and more 
reassuring map of power, one in which the assumption of sovereignty remains secure.” BUTLER, 
supra note 130, at 78. 
 167. One might think, for example, of Andres Serrano’s famous (and famously 
controversial) photograph Piss Christ, which depicts a crucifix submerged in urine. No matter 
how sacred the symbol or speech, it is always capable of appropriation. 
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statement168—hence the struggle to keep the motto on the coins and 
require its posting in schools. Repetition may be a technique for 
undermining a particular illocutionary force, but it may also be an 
attempt to counteract the inherent vulnerability of language and 
reinforce a particular illocutionary act.169 
Yet the illocutionary act succeeds only “to the extent that it 
draws on and covers over” its origins.170 The motto “In God We 
Trust,” for example, succeeds in describing or imposing a view about 
American religious values to the extent that, in context, it calls upon 
its historical usage—for example, as a unifying sentiment in the Civil 
War era171—while covering over both its original religiosity and the 
spirit of exclusion that motivated the motto’s adoption in the 1950s.172 
In so doing, the motto gives the illusion of a universal belief that can 
claim the support of virtually all citizens.173 It is only in this way that 
 
 168. It is interesting to note in this connection how many of the recent legal and political 
controversies in the Establishment Clause domain center precisely around the sort of symbolic 
struggle Butler describes, in the form of linguistic or nonlinguistic religious government 
expression. Since 2005, for example, all of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause opinions 
have been about the constitutionality of some form of religious expression, and the Court’s most 
recent decision, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), similarly dealt with 
religious expression, but in a free speech context. One suspects that a sort of displacement is 
taking place—a displacement of struggles over political power and the government fisc to 
struggles over symbolic power. 
 169. Indeed, the Netcong case, discussed above, may also be read as an instance in which 
repetition is an attempt to reinforce certain norms in the face of recent threats to them. In 
Netcong, the New Jersey Superior Court enjoined a local school district’s practice of reading the 
legislative prayer out of the Congressional Record to those students who wished to listen. 
Netcong, 262 A.2d at 32. Although the case was decided before Marsh, it is interesting to note 
that the court did not appear to believe the congressional practice of legislative prayer to be 
unconstitutional but found that the repetition of those prayers in a different context was an 
imposition of religion on the schoolchildren. Id. at 29–32. Like the AFA’s efforts to install the 
national motto in schools, the school district’s practice seemed to be an attempt to shore up the 
religious message of those legislative prayers by repeating them in a context that enhanced their 
religious force. The context of that action was the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the 1960s 
striking down school prayers. Whereas the legislative prayers may go virtually unnoticed in the 
halls of Congress, with legislators entering and leaving throughout, the prayers’ recitation in the 
school context draws special attention to their content. 
 170. Or, in Judith Butler’s terms, the speech act succeeds “to the extent that it draws on and 
covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized”—that is, the sociohistorical 
context or contexts that give it its force. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (emphasis omitted); 
BUTLER, supra note 137, at 227. 
 171. See supra note 3. 
 172. See supra note 3. 
 173. The solemnizing use of the phrase also denies the motto’s historicity and the 
multiplicity of potential and actual usages contained within that history—as in the “sacrilegious” 
jokes. 
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courts can claim that such invocations are purely patriotic rather than 
religious sayings. They must deny the origins of the phrase and the 
political dynamic that informed its adoption to install it as a generic 
sentiment of national pride. 
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review 
& Advisory Board174 neatly illustrates this dynamic of covering. This 
Sixth Circuit case turned away a constitutional challenge to the Ohio 
state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” which had been 
adopted in 1959 and was proposed to be inscribed in large letters in 
front of the statehouse.175 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ claim 
that the motto itself was unconstitutional, but it did enjoin the state 
from attributing it to the New Testament, from which the words were 
in fact adopted.176 The phrase thus having been stripped of its origins, 
the appeals court asserted that “[t]here is . . . nothing uniquely 
Christian about the thought that all things are possible with God.”177 
It then proceeded to catalog, based on expert testimony, various 
appearances of the sentiment throughout a panoply of religious and 
philosophical traditions, including Greek philosophy, Judaism, Islam, 
and Hinduism; ultimately, the court agreed with the defendants’ 
expert that Jesus’s original statement in the New Testament “was 
simply using a proverbial phrase that was commonly known and 
accepted as true.”178 Indeed, the court even quoted expert testimony 
claiming that the phrase was functionally equivalent to Yogi Berra’s 
saying, “[i]t’s never [sic] over until it’s over.”179 
Ironically, however, the history cited by the court both “draws on 
and covers over”180 the social and historical context that is both 
present and buried within the motto. Having papered over the 
 
 174. ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc). 
 175. Id. at 291–92. 
 176. Id. at 293. 
 177. Id. at 303. 
 178. Id. at 303–05 (emphasis omitted) (quoting an expert witness for the defendant). 
 179. Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, Berra said “It ain’t over ‘til it’s 
over.” YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: “I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!” 121 
(1998). Apparently, the Sixth Circuit preceded Chief Justice Roberts in correcting an icon’s 
grammar when quoting from the archives of pop culture. See Adam Liptak, The Chief Justice, 
Dylan and the Disappearing Double Negative, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008 (Week in Review) 
(noting that Chief Justice Roberts quoted Bob Dylan in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC 
Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008), but corrected his grammar, “proving that [Roberts] is 
neither an originalist nor a strict constructionist”). 
 180. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (emphasis omitted). 
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motto’s origin in the New Testament, the court attempted to 
demonstrate the multiplicity of religious and philosophical traditions 
that embrace the motto’s sentiment. Yet the force of the phrase—an 
injurious force for some—draws precisely on the fact that it does not 
say (as does Homer, quoted by the court), “[t]o the gods all things are 
possible,”181 or, as does Yogi Berra, “[i]t’s never [sic] over until it’s 
over.”182 Rather, it is a phrase with specifically Christian origins, 
chosen from a sacred Christian text. It is nearly impossible to imagine 
that the state would have accepted a suggestion to modify the motto 
to read “to the gods all things are possible.” The motto’s unique 
meaning is dependent upon its religious and Christian origins; yet the 
court covers over those origins in suggesting that the phrase is 
nothing other than an uncontroversial and universally shared 
sentiment.183 The motto’s effectiveness as a religious statement arises 
from its ability to draw upon and cover over its original context. 
As this account makes clear, speech acts often appear to deny or 
conceal their original context—particularly when they are repeated 
throughout history and in varying new contexts—but at the same 
time, the original context continues to give the speech act its force. In 
addition, the original context that must be concealed is often a 
context of political or social subordination or strife.184 Such contexts 
are ignored so that the speech act can appear to possess a singular, 
unifying, and uncontroversial meaning. But in reality, the past 
meaning persists, if only as the original context that gives the speech 
act its force and authority. Past social context therefore may play a 
 
 181. ACLU of Ohio, 243 F.3d at 303. 
 182. Id. at 305. 
 183. Cf. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF 
CULTURE 13, 13 (Robert Post ed., 1991) (describing the testimony of the legislative chaplain in 
Marsh, who occasionally prayed in the name of Jesus but claimed to strive to represent “just 
civil religion in America” and “the Judeo-Christian tradition . . . that [is] common to the vast, 
overwhelming majority of most all Americans” (quoting testimony of Robert E. Palmer, Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), joint appendix)); see also Brief of Baptist Joint Committee 
and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 03-1500), 2004 WL 2899175, at *7–8 (noting that courts dealing 
with challenges to Ten Commandments displays tend to “rip[] from context” and emphasize 
“the Commandments with secular equivalents”); cf. Christopher Lund, Keeping the 
Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
46, 51 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28 
Lund.pdf (describing how the Solicitor General’s brief in Pleasant Grove subtly connected the 
Summum religion to al-Qaeda to portray it as “false, dangerous, and un-American”). 
 184. Lund, supra note 183, at 51–52 (arguing that endorsement of one religion always entails 
exclusion of another, though that exclusion is rarely acknowledged or made explicit). 
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role in interpreting such speech acts. An understanding of any history 
of subordination or strife will be relevant to discerning the present 
force of a particular instance of ceremonial deism for Establishment 
Clause purposes. 
To summarize, there is support for the theory that repetition and 
long use may mitigate the religious force of a facially religious 
reference. At the same time, repetition invokes and often reinforces 
the prior meanings and origins on which new meanings depend. 
Meaning is thus capable of changing, but it more often displays a 
surprising persistence. Moreover, the effectiveness of speech acts 
often depends precisely on their ability to cover over their origins; as 
such, it is particularly important to be attentive to the social context 
that gave rise to a particular statement or phrase. As discussed further 
in Part III, moreover, there is great reason to doubt, in many 
instances at least, the claim that a religious phrase has lost its religious 
significance over time. 
C. Uptake 
A final, critical aspect of illocutionary acts is that of uptake. For 
an utterance to constitute an actual promise, endorsement, or any 
other speech act, it must “secur[e] . . . uptake.”185 As John Searle 
explains, the illocutionary act of ordering someone to do something 
might be unsuccessful in certain circumstances: 
For example, I might utter the sentence to someone who does not 
hear me, and so I would not succeed in performing the illocutionary 
act of ordering him, even though I did perform a locutionary act 
since I uttered the sentence with its usual meaning (in Austin’s 
terminology in such cases I fail to secure ‘illocutionary uptake’). Or, 
to take a different example, I might not be in a position to issue 
orders to him, if, say, he is a general and I am a private . . . .186 
In the context of an individual speech act by one speaker to 
another, the concept of uptake seems relatively straightforward. In 
the context of ceremonial deism, however, in which a constitutional 
challenge is brought regarding instances of government speech on 
coins or in classroom recitations, this concept becomes highly 
 
 185. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 116; see also Hurd, supra note 106, at 958 (“One must 
intend to produce a ‘certain response’ in one’s audience . . . . described by J.L. Austin as 
‘uptake.’”). 
 186. Searle, supra note 116, at 409. 
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problematic. Such challenges generally assume any number of 
possible hearers or readers;187 the court is concerned not just with the 
speech’s effect on the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs but with its 
effect, in a sense, on all citizens.188 This opens up the problem that 
different speech acts may evoke different kinds of responses from 
different hearers; the speech act of endorsement or proselytization 
may be successful or unsuccessful, depending on how it is received by 
a given speaker. 
Ultimately, the problems evoked by the uptake requirement for 
illocutionary acts simply reflect a problem inherent in language 
itself—perhaps particularly in language that is sufficiently 
controversial or divisive as to evoke varying responses among 
different individuals. Whenever a court must determine the social 
meaning of a phrase, symbol, or practice, the question of whose 
perspective is relevant immediately arises. This problem inheres in all 
of the jurisprudence concerning official references to religion, and the 
literature about government religious speech has already covered that 
ground extensively.189 I have discussed this problem elsewhere as well, 
acknowledging the thorny problems posed by the reception of the 
speech among different hearers but doubting that it can be solved in 
an entirely satisfactory way.190 
 
 187. Cf. Hurd, supra note 106, at 980–81 (noting the lack of a specific “audience” for most 
legislative utterances). 
 188. Indeed, the problem may be exacerbated by the fact that most Establishment Clause 
challenges to religious speech are facial challenges. 
 189. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, “We Know It when We See It”: The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–37 (1986) (“[A] symbol has no natural meaning 
independent of its ‘interpretive community’ . . . . [Yet] the interpretation of symbols, and 
perhaps religion itself, is inherently irrational.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84 (1985))); Frank S. Ravitch, 
Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1073–75 (2005) (“[G]iven 
the nature of religious objects, there may be no possible ‘reasonable person’ to try to rely upon 
in analyzing a religious object.” (quoting Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and 
Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause 
Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 83–93 (1990))); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and 
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
266, 322–25 (1987) (discussing “the problem of divergent perspectives” under the endorsement 
test). 
 190. Hill, supra note 25, at 530–33, 539–44. Justice Thomas’s brief concurring opinion in 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), represents an 
interesting example of a symbol whose meaning has arguably changed over time, but whose 
meaning is complicated by the problem of uptake. Id. at 770–72 (Thomas, J., concurring). In 
Pinette, which revolved around the question of whether the display of an unattended Latin cross 
sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan in a public forum near the seat of state government would 
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice Thomas agreed with the result—permitting the cross 
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To some extent, however, speech act theory aims precisely to 
avoid the problem of differing perspectives. As explained in Part 
II.B.2, speech act theory assumes that utterances can have meaning 
without reference to the intentions of any particular speaker and 
without assuming any particular hearer.191 This kind of meaning is 
often called “sentence meaning”—that is, the meaning that a sentence 
has to someone familiar with the conventions of the language, 
regardless of the speaker’s subjective intentions.192 Some theorists also 
refer to this concept of meaning as “public meaning.”193 The concept 
of sentence meaning does not deny that a particular utterance may 
have different meanings for different hearers, but rather attempts to 
bracket those meanings and instead focus on the meaning that the 
“conventions of language” dictate for that utterance.194 
At the same time, I acknowledge that the meaning dictated by 
linguistic conventions is not always determinate, particularly when 
the subject of the utterance is a religious one, thus tending to evoke 
differing viewpoints from different audiences. Nonetheless, I believe 
that a presumption that facially religious phrases continue to have 
 
on free speech grounds—but disagreed with the majority’s basic premise that the cross was a 
religious symbol. Id. Examining specifically the Klan’s use of the cross throughout its history, 
Justice Thomas admitted that occasionally the cross took on religious connotations but 
primarily concluded that “[t]he Klan simply has appropriated one of the most sacred of religious 
symbols as a symbol of hate,” and therefore that the case really did not “involve[] the 
Establishment Clause.” Id. at 771. Recognizing the symbol’s use for racial rather than religious 
subordination and intimidation by the Klan for the bulk of its history, Justice Thomas’s concise 
but subtle opinion takes the position that the cross, in this context, has lost its religious meaning 
through its repetitive use and appropriation in a variety of nonreligious contexts. Id. This 
viewpoint has a certain intuitive force, no doubt in part because it focuses specifically on the 
Klan cross itself. At the same time, it demonstrates how the Klan’s use of the cross to intimidate 
and harass both draws upon and covers over the cross’s religious meaning, which waxed and 
waned over time and perhaps reached its peak through the Klan’s association with southern 
clergy in the 1920s. Id. But in any case, it appears to be the sort of symbol that has different 
meanings to different audiences, depending not only on their race but on their familiarity with 
the history of the United States and the Ku Klux Klan. 
 191. See Hurd, supra note 106, at 965 (noting that the “conventions of language are what 
provide for the illocutionary acts which may be performed by the use of a particular sentence,” 
and therefore that “[w]e need not look to the intentions of a speaker to determine the meaning 
of a particular sentence uttered by the speaker”); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 124, 145–46 (2007) (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 
(1989)) (distinguishing “speaker’s meaning” from “sentence meaning”). 
 192. PAUL GRICE, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in STUDIES IN 
THE WAY OF WORDS 117, 124 (1989) (distinguishing “timeless meaning” from “occasion 
meaning”); Hurd, supra note 106, at 962–67. 
 193. Solum, supra note 191, at 135 (quoting GRICE, supra note 192, at 117–37). 
 194. Hurd, supra note 106, at 965. 
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religious meaning, which I discuss further in Part III.B, combined 
with a focus on issues such as past social context and past divisiveness, 
might make inroads toward minimizing the problem of differing 
perspectives among different hearers. At a minimum, I believe that it 
is a superior solution to other existing proposals, such as encouraging 
courts to adopt the position of the “reasonable nonadherent.”195 A 
presumption against certain kinds of speech will give courts a baseline 
from which to determine the meaning and force of such speech—a 
baseline that may well conflict with a judge’s inherent biases but will 
likely align with the viewpoint of religious outsiders. Simply asking a 
judge to step into the shoes of someone unlike herself, on the other 
hand, appears to require an ill-defined act of empathy and is 
therefore less likely to be effective. Law, by and large, works by 
means of technical rules like burdens of proof and presumptions, 
rather than acts of sympathetic imagination. A presumption that 
pushes judges in one particular direction when they are in doubt 
about the social meaning of religious government speech gives at least 
some guidance in a highly contested case. 
III.  CEREMONIAL DEISM, SPEECH ACT THEORY, AND 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
A. Speech Act Theory and Establishment Clause Doctrine 
My contention here is that when courts evaluate religious 
references under the Establishment Clause, they are largely 
concerned with the illocutionary force or effect of these references. 
Likewise, speech act theory is geared primarily toward questions 
about what people do—what effects they bring about—when they 
speak.196 This particular orientation explains both the title of Austin’s 
book and the almost exclusive focus of speech act theory on 
 
 195. Leading Cases: Government Sponsored Religious Displays, 103 HARV. L. REV. 228, 234 
& n.46 (1989); see also Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: 
Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 915–16 (1987) (arguing that courts 
should “focus[] on the reasonable perception of persons who would feel pressured and alienated 
by the allegedly sponsored message”); Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648–49 (1987) (“[A]pplication must turn on the message received by the 
minority or nonadherent.”). 
 196. Gorman, supra note 106, at 102–03. Gorman quotes the philosopher G.J. Warnock, 
who pointed out that Austin’s book “has almost nothing at all to say” about language itself; 
rather, Austin “was willing simply to assume that we have ‘got’ a language, with a view to 
getting on to the question: what do we do with it?” Id. at 103 (quoting G.J. WARNOCK, J.L. 
AUSTIN 151 (1989)). 
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understanding illocutionary force.197 Indeed, for this reason, speech 
act theory is largely viewed not as a branch of linguistics but of 
philosophy—specifically, of the branch of philosophy known as 
pragmatics.198 
The jurisprudence dealing with religious government speech is 
also similarly preoccupied with linguistic effects. It is, at its core, 
concerned not so much with the sense and reference of certain 
phrases, terms, symbols, or even practices, as it is concerned with 
what they do. Thus, although the locutionary force of “In God We 
Trust” may be obvious, and obviously religious, the illocutionary 
force is not necessarily so clear. Is it an endorsement of religion, or at 
least of belief in God? Can it be said to be proselytizing? Or does it 
merely acknowledge the role of religion in the nation’s history? These 
are questions about illocutionary force, and they are the questions 
that are relevant to the constitutional analysis. And indeed, the same 
is true for symbols (such as Christmas trees or crèches) and practices 
(such as legislative prayer), at least to the extent that courts are 
concerned with their social meaning—that is, with their potential 
endorsing or proselytizing effect.199 Thus, although the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding religious speech may ask the right 
questions, it does not point to any clear methodology for answering 
 
 197. Id. at 103 (noting that speech act theorists have understood “[t]he notion of 
illocutionary force” to be Austin’s “most significant theoretical contribution”). 
 198. It is fair to say that Austin’s book aimed to make a contribution not only to the 
philosophy of language but also to the philosophy of action. See, e.g., L.W. Forguson, Austin’s 
Philosophy of Action, in SYMPOSIUM ON J.L. AUSTIN 127, 127–28 (K.T. Fann ed., 1969) 
(“[Austin’s] contribution to the philosophy of action was of great originality and importance.”); 
J.O. Urmson, W.V.O. Quine & Stuart Hampshire, A Symposium on Austin’s Method, in 
SYMPOSIUM ON J.L. AUSTIN, supra, at 76, 81–83 (discussing Austin’s aims to add to the 
understanding of language within, inter alia, the fields of linguistics, grammatics, jurisprudence, 
and economics); cf. SEARLE, supra note 130, at 17 (“[A] theory of language is part of a theory of 
action, simply because speaking is a rule-governed form of behavior.”). 
 199. Because of its preoccupation with social meaning and the application of speech act 
theory to theories of social meaning, this Article is also relevant to, and in dialogue with, a line 
of constitutional theory known as “expressivism,” which considers the constitutional 
implications of the messages sent by government actions—that is, of their social meaning. See 
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (“Expressivism is thus an internal account of 
existing normative practices, but one with sufficient critical capacity to exert leverage over those 
practices and to indicate when they ought to be reformed.”); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. 
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2128 n.23 (1990) (citing the authors’ “distinct 
concerns with the expressive dimensions of actions”). 
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them. Speech act theory may be able to provide some guiding 
principles for doing just that. 
One of this Article’s primary contentions is therefore not only 
that Establishment Clause doctrine is primarily concerned with the 
illocutionary force of religious references—and, as a consequence, 
that speech act theory is relevant to their analysis—but also that the 
cases and commentary dealing with such references come up lacking 
in part because they are insufficiently attentive to the distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary forces of utterances. Thus, it 
may be true that, as several commentators have pointed out, it simply 
blinks reality to say that the words “under God” have no religious 
meaning, in terms of that phrase’s sense and reference. Yet, it may be 
true to say, in a particular context or setting, that the words do not 
have the illocutionary force of proselytizing or endorsing religion. 
Thus, much of the case law discussing the Pledge of Allegiance 
revolves around whether reciting the Pledge is a religious or patriotic 
act—again, a question about illocutionary force.200 Similarly, the city 
name Corpus Christi has a religious referent—it literally means “body 
of Christ”—but the illocutionary effect of the name, which is the 
focus of Establishment Clause analysis, may or may not be to endorse 
religion. 
Illocutionary force is thus the focus of the Establishment Clause 
inquiry in any case in which symbolic government acts, and therefore 
social meaning, are involved. This fact is illustrated, to take one 
particularly clear example, in a lower court case in which the 
locutionary act was arguably absent. In Saladin v. City of 
Milledgeville,201 the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the word “Christianity” in a city seal on the 
city’s official stationery, even though the word appeared only as an 
illegible smudge.202 Despite the failure of the smudge to perform a 
locutionary act, the court held that it could still perform an 
illocutionary act of endorsing Christianity and conveying the message 
to the plaintiffs that they were second-class citizens: 
[W]e reject the notion that the illegibility of the word “Christianity” 
on the seal as it is presently used means that these plaintiffs cannot 
have suffered and will not in the future suffer any injury from its use. 
 
 200. See, e.g., Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
Pledge, unlike prayer, is not a religious exercise or activity, but a patriotic one.”). 
 201. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 202. Id. at 691–93. 
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Although the district court and the City equate the illegibility of the 
offensive word with the complete absence of the offensive word 
from the city seal, the fact is that the word is still part of the 
seal. . . . The fact remains that the word “Christianity” with all of its 
connotations is part of the official city seal, and these appellants are 
reminded of that fact every time they are confronted with the city 
seal—smudged or not smudged.203 
The quoted language demonstrates that the court’s concern is 
primarily with the effect, or force, of the word on the city seal, rather 
than with its meaning, in the sense of locutionary force. Indeed, it 
would be incoherent to speak of an illegible smudge as having any 
sort of sense or referent. Moreover, the notion that an illegible 
smudge can cause injury to the plaintiffs, sufficient to ground Article 
III standing, again requires a theory that focuses on illocutionary 
force rather than the locutionary act giving rise to it.204 Moreover, this 
notion may be carried over to other instances in which a nonlinguistic 
government practice—such as the display of religious symbolism or 
the observance of religious holidays—is challenged on the ground 
that it endorses religion. Although there is no locutionary meaning in 
the typical sense, the illocutionary force—which I contend is roughly 
synonymous with social meaning in this context—of the practice is the 
true focus of the court’s analysis and the parties’ dispute. 
Admittedly, this Article does not take a stand on which doctrinal 
test—the endorsement test, the coercion test, the ill-defined Marsh 
test, or another test altogether—is the appropriate one for resolving 
Establishment Clause disputes regarding ceremonial deism. Rather, it 
aims to assist with answering a question that lurks behind all of those 
tests—namely, the methodological question of how to determine 
whether the meaning of a challenged utterance has retained its 
religious significance. The following Section thus presents several 
guideposts for making that determination. The final Section then 
attempts to apply these guideposts to some concrete examples. 
B. Doctrinal Implications 
It would be foolish to contend that the complex body of theory I 
have just described can yield easy answers to constitutional 
 
 203. Id. at 691–92. 
 204. Cf. King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2003) (inferring an 
emphasis on legal rather than religious connotations from the fact that the Ten Commandments 
on a challenged city seal appeared without any text). 
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challenges. This Section nonetheless outlines a basic doctrinal test, 
centering on a rebuttable presumption of continuing religious 
meaning, that incorporates the insights of speech act theory and 
provides some guidance for judicial analysis of ceremonial deism. As 
explained below, this approach breaks in many ways with the current 
judicial approaches to ceremonial deism and the assumptions on 
which many courts and commentators rely. 
1. A Rebuttable Presumption.  The proposal that courts should 
adopt a rebuttable presumption of continuing religious meaning when 
confronted with a challenge to ceremonial deism grows out of several 
key principles of speech act theory. First, speech act theory’s 
emphasis on illocutionary force over locutionary force suggests that 
the presence of facially religious language should not, despite the 
views of some commentators, automatically mean that the language’s 
effect is religious. Courts therefore should attend not only to the 
literal language itself but to the present force of the language. Of 
course, most courts already take this approach when confronted with 
challenges to ceremonial deism, but it bears repeating that they 
should not be subject to criticism simply for acknowledging the 
possibility that facially religious language may lack religious force. 
Second, speech act theory teaches that meaning, although 
vulnerable to change, has a tenaciousness that is often 
underappreciated. The capacity of meaning to persist over time both 
argues in favor of a presumption of religious meaning—to take 
account of meaning’s persistence—and suggests the importance of 
history and social context in determining whether a speech act retains 
its religious force. Indeed, as described above, speech acts have a 
tendency to be most effective when concealing the sort of history of 
subordination or divisiveness that lies behind them.205 Utterances like 
the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the national 
motto, and the Ohio state motto are most successful as unifying 
sentiments when they are presented as uncontroversial statements of 
uncontested fact, not as divisive religious tenets.206 Ten 
Commandments displays are most likely to garner support as broadly 
accepted statements of morality, and legislative prayer to appear as a 
mere solemnizing statement of civil religion, when the suppression of 
 
 205. Supra Part II.B.4. 
 206. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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other religious messages is ignored.207 Moreover, it is precisely the 
phrase’s repetition and long use that works to create this apparent 
effect of universal acceptability, while hiding its religious and 
religiously divisive origins. As such, courts should be particularly 
sensitive to clues regarding an utterance’s history. A rebuttable 
presumption of persisting religious meaning thus counteracts courts’ 
tendency to ignore or paper over the history of religious division and 
exclusion that continues to inform an utterance’s present meaning. 
Third, speech act theory teaches that the speech acts of 
“describing” and “acknowledging” may be far less neutral and passive 
than they appear. The act of describing a reality may instead have a 
tendency to create and enforce that reality; moreover, this danger 
seems particularly acute when the describing is done in the name of 
the state. This effect may be intensified rather than lessened by the 
repetition of certain phrases throughout history, as that repetition, 
too, may be an attempt to shore up the reality that the phrase appears 
merely to describe.208 
Indeed, as noted above, describing and acknowledging are 
speech acts like any others. And these speech acts are the ones to 
which courts often recur when explaining why a particular instance of 
ceremonial deism is constitutional. The legislative prayer in Marsh, 
the crèche scene in Lynch, and the words “under God” in Newdow’s 
concurrences are all labeled as merely descriptive, or as mere 
acknowledgements of religion’s role in American history.209 Yet in 
performing the act of describing, one is often simultaneously 
constructing a particular reality. This is particularly true when 
government speech—the voice of authority—is at issue. Indeed, 
“[e]ven the most strictly constative scientific description is always 
open to the possibility of functioning in a prescriptive way, capable of 
contributing to its own verification [and] . . . help[ing] to bring about 
 
 207. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 164–68. 
 209. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (twice labeling the words “under God” in the Pledge 
“descriptive”); id. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the phrase 
“under God is merely descriptive”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“We are 
unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or other powerful 
religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially 
recognized by the three constitutional branches of government. Any notion that these symbols 
pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed.”); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (describing legislative prayer as “simply a tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country”). 
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that which it declares.”210 Moreover, “[t]he effectiveness of the 
performative discourse which claims to bring about what it asserts in 
the very act of asserting it is directly proportional to the authority of 
the person doing the asserting.”211 
In his extended essay on monuments and the changing social 
responses to them over time, Professor Sanford Levinson gives 
examples of how public monuments claim to represent the official 
meaning of historical events, sometimes evoking enormous 
controversy.212 “[M]onuments,” he asserts, “are quintessentially 
‘about time’ and who shall control the meaning assigned to Proustian 
moments of past time.”213 Indeed, Professor Levinson notes that 
monument inscriptions may “set[] out what might be called, in our 
postmodernist times, the officially privileged narrative of the 
events.”214 Insightfully, he adds, “One might well believe . . . that [a 
particular] statement was designed more to create a desired state of 
public consciousness than to describe accurately” the reality.215 
Finally, it is a relevant consideration that courts themselves 
engage in official government speech and that a court’s attempt to 
characterize a phrase and its history may itself fall into the traps of 
papering over past divisiveness and attempting to construct the reality 
it describes. “The law,” in other words, “is the quintessential form of 
‘active’ discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects.”216 
Mark De Wolfe Howe has pointed out, speaking specifically with 
respect to the Supreme Court’s now much-disputed use of history in 
Establishment Clause cases, that Americans “tend to think that 
because a majority of the justices have the power to bind us by their 
law they are also empowered to bind us by their history”; and indeed, 
the Court’s assertions about history, like its legal assertions, often 
become solidified in law and cited as precedent.217 
 
 210. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 134 (John B. Thompson ed., 
Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1984). 
 211. Id. at 223. 
 212. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING 
SOCIETIES 45–48 (1998) (discussing the controversial Liberty Monument in New Orleans). 
 213. Id. at 31. 
 214. Id. at 48. 
 215. Id. at 49. 
 216. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987). 
 217. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5 (1965); cf. Steven K. 
Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1717, 1733 (2006) (noting that when the Court “endeavors to write an 
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Likewise, the Court’s assertions about the religious or 
nonreligious meaning or effect of certain phrases and practices embed 
themselves in the doctrine, to be cited by other courts in the future. 
Numerous courts, for example, point to the Court’s dicta to assert 
that the national motto has lost its religious meaning over time or that 
the Pledge is a patriotic rather than religious exercise.218 The 
congressional resolution encouraging display of the national motto in 
public buildings similarly refers to Supreme Court cases for the 
propositions that “the motto is a reference to the Nation’s religious 
heritage”; that “the national motto recognizes the religious beliefs 
and practices of the American people as an aspect of our national 
history and culture”; and that “the motto recognizes the historical fact 
that our Nation was believed to have been founded ‘under God.’”219 
The possibility that judicial language may not just describe the 
Founders’ beliefs but attempt to create one particular dominant and 
official narrative of those beliefs—combined with the fact that 
repetition of a phrase or a norm may be an attempt to reinforce its 
meaning and counteract its inherent vulnerability—again gives reason 
to be skeptical of courts’ assertions that a particular phrase 
constitutes mere description or acknowledgment of the nation’s 
history rather than endorsement of religion or proselytizing. The 
printing of “In God We Trust” on coins or the insertion of “under 
God” in the Pledge may be as much attempts to create a particular 
religious sentiment, or to place a particular gloss on American 
history, as they are mere neutral statements of fact. This recognition 
should be particularly powerful in light of the fact that courts often 
gloss over the highly contested history of such phrases. A rebuttable 
presumption that a facially religious phrase conveys religious meaning 
is justifiable to counteract these tendencies. 
Indeed, all of the principles of speech act theory that I have just 
outlined lead to the conclusion that courts should be more suspicious 
than they currently are of claims that a particular government 
practice has lost its religious meaning through repetition or the 
passage of time. At the same time, it is the inescapable inference of 
this Article—and the theory it has advanced—that meaning can 
 
authoritative chapter in the intellectual history of the American people, as it does when it lays 
historical foundations beneath its readings of the First Amendment, then any distortion 
becomes a matter of consequence” (quoting HOWE, supra, at 4)). 
 218. E.g., Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 219. H.R. Res. 548, 106th Cong. (2000) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984)). 
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change in some circumstances. I therefore argue that courts should 
apply a rebuttable presumption of religious meaning to all instances 
of ceremonial deism. 
2. Rebutting the Presumption.  The rebuttable presumption I 
envision would function primarily as a burden-shifting technique. A 
plaintiff challenging an instance of ceremonial deism would have to 
show only facially religious language to get the benefit of a rebuttable 
presumption of continuing religious meaning. At that point, the 
burden would shift to the government to prove that the religious 
meaning has been lost. The government could do so in one of two 
ways. It could either demonstrate the absence of religious 
illocutionary force, as in the case of place names or other genuinely 
referential or citational phrases, or it could show that the 
sociohistorical context contains no divisive or religiously oppressive 
past that continues to inform the present usage. If the government’s 
showing is unconvincing or if the plaintiff is able to undermine the 
government’s claims, the utterance should be considered a religious 
one. At that point, the court would apply the endorsement or 
coercion test to determine whether the religious speech is 
unconstitutional.220 
The possibility of rebutting the presumption—through an 
explanation of the illocutionary force or a study of the sociohistorical 
context—thus recognizes that in some cases a phrase may legitimately 
lose its religious meaning. The jokes concerning the national motto, 
though they rely on its religious origins, necessarily undermine the 
religious sentiment to achieve their humorous effect. Similarly, a 
court’s statement that “The phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge of 
Allegiance is unconstitutional” would not itself be unconstitutional, 
though the phrase is technically an instance of facially religious 
government speech. Finally, as discussed below, one might doubt 
whether the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, or 
perhaps even the use of “A.D.” on public documents, should be 
unconstitutional given the apparent lack of religious impact those 
terms convey. 
 
 220. Under the Marsh test, it is less clear what a court should do when confronted with a 
history and tradition indicating continuing religious meaning, as the Marsh test appears merely 
to tell courts to look at history and tradition to determine whether speech is constitutionally 
acceptable. In essence, my proposed approach is incompatible with the Marsh approach. 
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The task of distinguishing these examples from the potentially 
unconstitutional examples just discussed is a delicate one, but it is 
possible. It seems that at least the first example could be distinguished 
by the fact that the motto is placed in a context that undermines its 
original meaning. To the extent it relies on that meaning, it does so 
only to break with it. As for the second example, unlike the use of the 
words “under God” to solemnize an occasion by drawing on the 
religious sentiment itself, the use of “under God” in the hypothetical 
holding described above does not rely on those words’ religious force 
to accomplish the sentence’s effect. The sentence would have the 
same meaning and effect if it referred to another, nonreligious phrase. 
Finally, the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, perhaps 
like the term “A.D,”221 seem to act not as assertions of facts or 
religious values but as placeholders—arbitrary referents that specify a 
time or place—for which another name could easily be substituted 
without changing its overall illocutionary force.222 Thus, a rebuttable 
presumption should be sufficient to convey skepticism about claims 
that certain phrases are simply describing, acknowledging, or 
referring to historical facts, while leaving room to uphold those 
facially religious terms that legitimately do merely refer or otherwise 
lack true religious force. 
Moreover, speech act theory suggests the importance of history 
and social context in analyzing meaning and therefore rebutting the 
presumption of religiosity. According to contemporary theories of 
language, “meaning . . . [is] historical through and through, produced 
in processes of contextualization, decontextualization, and 
recontextualization.”223 For the most part, however, courts have not 
used history in appropriate ways. Rather, as described above, they 
often simply have noted the frequency of a particular term or 
practice, or the ubiquity of the Framers’ religious practices and 
religious acknowledgement in general, drawing from these facts 
conclusions about the constitutionality of specific practices. Yet this 
sort of historical approach is overly simplistic and fails to capture the 
genuine historical quality of meaning. Moreover, such history 
proceeds by “interpreting the supposedly less complex and 
 
 221. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 222. The referential placeholder nature of city names may be contrasted with the Sixth 
Circuit’s attempt to place the Ohio motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” in the same 
framework in ACLU of Ohio. The motto could not be replaced by Yogi Berra’s aphorism “It 
ain’t over ‘til it’s over” and continue to have the exact same meaning and illocutionary force. 
 223. CULLER, supra note 114, at 128. 
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ambiguous texts of a period,” assuming a purity and clarity of motives 
and understandings in an earlier time, in contrast with the present 
day.224 
Rather than engaging in what Steven Green has called “general 
history,” by which courts “extrapolat[e] meaning from general 
historical facts removed from their context and announc[e] their 
commanding relevance for current practices,” courts must engage in a 
specific historical examination that includes consideration of the 
sociohistorical context of the term or practice at issue.225 That is to say, 
the history used by courts to determine meaning should be both 
specific to the term or practice at issue, rather than drawing on 
sweeping historical narratives, and attentive to issues of power and 
social subordination. In this way, courts can use the history to 
understand the social meaning of the term itself, not just to draw a 
conclusion about its constitutionality by analogizing to other 
historical practices or by means of an “any more than” test. 
The need for specificity can be derived from the lessons of 
speech act theory. Speech act theory focuses on the illocutionary 
effects produced by a particular locutionary act and on the history of 
usages of a particular term. Speech act theory demonstrates the ways 
in which different social or historical contexts can change the 
meanings of a given utterance. In addition, it emphasizes the 
necessary conventionality and repeatability of speech acts, such that 
the same speech act must be recognizable in different contexts or 
when used by different speakers. Thus, although the broader context 
in which the term is mobilized will always come into play, the focus 
must always be on the specific term or practice at issue.226 
Thus, the historical approach should examine, to the extent 
possible, the sociohistorical context of the term, practice, or symbol, 
with attention to the power relations it might imply. Because the 
various usages to which a term has historically been put inform the 
current illocutionary force, attention should be paid to these past 
usages—including their religious or nonreligious nature and the 
presence or absence of subordination of certain religious groups. This 
would entail consideration of whether in the past the phrase has been 
 
 224. Id. at 129. 
 225. Green, supra note 217, at 1725, 1732. 
 226. Cf. Conkle, supra note 105, at 335 (discussing different levels of generality at which 
history and tradition may be examined in Establishment Clause inquiries and appearing to 
prefer the more specific approach). 
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divisive, has been used as an endorsement of a particular religious 
belief, and has had the effect of oppressing religious minorities. It 
would also be important to consider whether there is something about 
the current usage of the phrase that suggests it is being used in a way 
that deviates or breaks from past usages. As noted above, there is a 
particular tendency in cases dealing with ceremonial deism to paper 
over a history of religious strife and oppression. 
Some of the Justices have suggested—most prominently in the 
recent Decalogue decisions, McCreary County v. ACLU and Van 
Orden v. Perry227—that the present or recent divisiveness of a religious 
symbol is particularly relevant to its constitutionality. This approach 
has been much criticized.228 Indeed, the notion that a lack of present 
divisiveness may prove that a symbol is constitutionally 
unproblematic recalls the suggestion that the performative succeeds 
“to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive 
conventions by which it is mobilized.”229 The lack of present 
divisiveness, in other words, may only indicate the success with which 
the symbol, practice, or term has covered over the power dynamics 
from which it arose and from which it continues to draw its force. The 
focus on sociohistorical context urged by this Article therefore would 
not consider (or would not only consider) present divisiveness, but 
rather past divisiveness and indications of religious subordination 
associated with the disputed symbol. 
An opinion that exemplifies this approach is Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly. Justice Brennan’s dissent criticized the 
majority opinion in that case for drawing on the general history of 
religious acknowledgement by official entities in upholding a nativity 
scene display erected by a municipality at Christmastime.230 Justice 
Brennan focused on the history of both public celebration of 
Christmas and nativity scenes—“the special history of the practice 
under review”—and concluded that the public celebration of 
 
 227. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 702–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 709 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Of these opinions, the most remarked upon is Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van 
Orden, because he appeared to elevate divisiveness to the level of an actual test for determining 
the outcome in Establishment Clause cases. 
 228. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–4 (2005); Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First 
Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1707–08 (2006). 
 229. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51; BUTLER, supra note 137, at 227. 
 230. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 705–20 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Christmas and various aspects of the holiday’s symbology had been a 
source of divisiveness among Christian sects until approximately the 
mid-nineteenth century.231 Justice Brennan’s dissent is aimed 
primarily at refuting the majority’s argument that Christmas 
celebrations and displays were constitutionally uncontroversial 
because of a historical practice of religious acknowledgement 
embraced by the Founders,232 rather than at attempting to determine 
the symbols’ illocutionary force, so it does not necessarily answer the 
questions that this Article advocates considering. Nonetheless, it 
displays the sort of attention to social history—noting, for example, 
the tensions between the Puritans and the Catholics that the public 
celebration of Christmas evoked—that is largely lacking from other 
opinions dealing with official religious speech. 
Similarly, a recent article by Professor Christopher Lund sheds 
serious doubt on the Marsh Court’s suggestion that legislative prayer, 
as practiced throughout the nation’s history, is and always has been 
innocuous and uncontroversial.233 Although the practice of legislative 
prayer at the federal congressional level is indeed one of long 
standing, Professor Lund demonstrates through detailed historical 
analysis that it has been mired in controversy from its inception.234 
The sectarian divisions and power struggles surrounding the practice 
were acute.235 Indeed, he concludes that the congressional 
chaplaincies “were never tame or benign, never immune to 
controversy, and never entirely insulated from the political culture 
that surrounded them.”236 Professor Lund’s analysis thus gives reason 
to doubt whether such prayers can be considered simple 
acknowledgements of the nation’s religious heritage.237 
Indeed, the extent to which judicial opinions ignore the history of 
intense sectarian and political divisiveness surrounding a religious 
phrase or practice is extraordinary. The majority opinions in Marsh, 
Lynch, and numerous lower court cases tend simply to catalog the 
multiple uses of a phrase or practice throughout history and to assert, 
based on a superficial view of this history, that the practice has been 
 
 231. Id. at 719. 
 232. Id. at 694. 
 233. Lund, supra note 32, at 1214. 
 234. Id. at 1177–207. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1214. 
 237. Id.; see also Post, supra note 183, at 16 (noting complaints about legislative prayer by 
legislators in Nebraska and, as early as 1907, by legislators in California). 
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uncontroversial and is therefore constitutional. Yet this reasoning is 
classically the sort of papering over of the divisive origins of a 
practice—drawing upon yet covering over its sociohistorical 
context—that does not undermine but instead reinforces the 
practice’s religious meaning by drawing upon that meaning for its 
power and authority as an expression of local or national unity or 
identity. At a minimum, this fact gives reason to doubt the truth of 
courts’ offhand assertions about the innocuousness of a practice and 
to instead dig deeper to consider the practice’s sociohistorical context. 
Only by showing either a lack of illocutionary force or a lack of 
historical divisiveness, then, should the government overcome the 
presumption of continuing religious meaning. 
C. Examples 
The final section of this Article attempts to apply the principles 
described above to concrete instances of ceremonial deism. Although 
the analysis demanded here is admittedly case and context specific, I 
hope to demonstrate that the insights of speech act theory may assist 
courts in dealing with challenges to cases of ceremonial deism and 
particularly in distinguishing among different kinds of cases. 
1. Place Names.  Challenges to the constitutionality of city names 
like Corpus Christi and St. Louis are the cases in which the 
presumption would most likely be rebutted. Although these names 
have obviously religious—even sectarian—content, they do not 
generally carry an illocutionary force that can be described as 
religious when they are used as proper names to refer to long-
established cities.238 Indeed, the city names of San Francisco and Los 
Angeles may carry with them many connotations, but religiosity, 
sainthood, and angels are not among the most immediate that leap to 
the minds of most Americans. Rather, those place names legitimately 
may be understood as referring to—almost “quoting”—the origins of 
those cities, which were often founded in tribute to a religious figure. 
Indeed, it seems that place names simply function differently from 
mottos or pledges: they are neither assertions of fact nor declarations 
 
 238. Under Justice O’Connor’s test for constitutionally acceptable ceremonial deism, which 
considers in part whether the challenged phrase has sectarian content, the city name of Corpus 
Christi would presumably raise some difficulties, although the other factors of her test 
(“[h]istory and [u]biquity,” “[a]bsence of worship or prayer,” and “[m]inimal religious content”) 
would presumably cut in the other direction. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 
1, 37–44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
HILL IN FINAL 12/1/2009  6:11:56 PM 
2010] CEREMONIAL DEISM 765 
of beliefs but simple referents whose arbitrariness is more or less 
assumed by those who use them.239 
Religious city names thus may be one instance in which a term 
has legitimately lost its religious meaning. Although they contain 
facially religious language, one may doubt that those names still carry 
religious force. And indeed, speech act theory assists in reaching this 
conclusion. Although a plaintiff challenging the city name of San 
Francisco, for example, would have the benefit of a presumption in 
her favor, an examination of illocutionary force, informed by 
sociohistorical context, should easily rebut the presumption. 
Although some city names may in fact recall an act of religious and 
political conquest, and although some names may be the subject of 
some contestation, in most cases it will be easy to show that the name, 
like most names, does no more than refer to the city’s historical 
origins and the religious figure after whom the city was named. The 
presumption of religious meaning could thus be rebutted without the 
necessity of examining sociohistorical context. 
Similarly, in a careful and insightful opinion, the United States 
District Court for the District of New Mexico recently turned away a 
challenge to a sculpture in front of a sports complex in Las Cruces, 
New Mexico, that included three artistically rendered Latin crosses.240 
Given that the city name of Las Cruces means “the crosses” in 
Spanish and probably originally referred to groups of crosses that 
marked massacre sites from colonial times in the area where the city 
was founded, the court sensibly noted that the crosses constituted a 
literal representation of the “uniquely named geopolitical 
subdivision”—a representation that is also found on the city’s official 
seal—“rather than an endorsement of Christianity.”241 
Of course, if in any given case a city name were found to have 
enduring religious meaning, it would still remain for the court to 
determine whether that religious meaning rendered it 
unconstitutional. A court would proceed to ask whether the religious 
meaning is one of endorsement or coercion. 
2. The Pledge and the Motto.  In the case of the Pledge and the 
national motto, it seems that the presumption of religious meaning 
 
 239. See generally SEARLE, supra note 130, at 72–96 (discussing the speech act of referring, 
as in the use of proper names). 
 240. Weinbaum v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122–23 (D.N.M. 2006). 
 241. Id. at 1132–33, 1149. 
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could not be rebutted in most contexts. The government could show 
neither that the practices lacked true illocutionary force—when 
recited in schools or stamped on coins, they are not mere 
placeholders or referents—nor that the sociohistorical context 
informing those practices is free of divisiveness or religious 
subordination. 
It is difficult to ignore the fact that both the Pledge and the 
motto are associated with periods in American history of intermixed 
religious and patriotic sentiment—namely, the Civil War and the 
Cold War.242 These periods were moments not just of generic religious 
sentiment but of attempting both to assert and consolidate the 
supremacy of God in the nation. And at least in the case of the 
Pledge, the assertion of the nation’s placement “under God” was 
accompanied by an intent to exclude and label as unpatriotic anyone 
who—like the godless Communists—rejected the view embodied in 
the phrase. As one commentator put it, “Jingoistic desires to paint a 
vivid contrast in the Cold War, separating ourselves, claiming ‘God’ 
within ‘our’ government, for sanctimonious contrast with ‘Godless 
atheistic’ Communism, made the deliberate appropriation of a 
pervasive religiosity an irresistibly useful instrument of state 
policy.”243 
Nor do the ubiquity and repetition of those phrases minimize 
their religious effect, contrary to what courts have claimed. For 
example, when Justice O’Connor argues that brief religious 
references serve “the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and 
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in 
society,” speech act theory asks why and how it can perform that 
function.244 Most likely it is because such references invoke a prior, 
explicitly religious set of practices and beliefs, and thereby 
“accumulate[] the force of authority through repetition or citation” of 
 
 242. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 786. 
 243. Id. Similarly, at least one historian suggests that the consolidation of Christmas as a 
national holiday with both religious and secular overtones, celebrated almost universally, also 
dates from the Civil War era and is in no small part associated with the post–Civil War search 
for a unifying national identity. RESTAD, supra note 23, at 91–104. 
 244. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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those practices.245 The usage of those phrases relies on the religious 
force of prior usages to accomplish the act of solemnizing or 
expressing confidence, for example.246 Like the word “Christianity” 
covered by a smudge in the Saladin case, the religious meaning of the 
motto persists and continues to affect its audience. 
It is thus precisely the intermingling of piety and patriotism—the 
national unification under the umbrella of religion that is both 
described and enforced by those practices—that is troubling from an 
Establishment Clause perspective. Courts’ description of the national 
motto or the Pledge as mere historical acknowledgements, like the 
Lynch Court’s similar description of the public celebration of 
Christmas, draws upon yet covers over the religious and religiously 
divisive history of these practices by making them synonymous with 
patriotism. 
A presumption that both the Pledge and the national motto have 
enduring religious meaning should not, therefore, be able to be 
rebutted. They are not instances in which the illocutionary force is 
clearly that of simply quoting or referring to a historical event, as in 
the case of city names. And the courts’ treatment of these phrases 
shows a distinct tendency to cover over a history of religious 
exclusion, which is manifest. Thus, the government would be unlikely 
to show that there was no history of divisiveness or religious strife 
behind these phrases or to overcome the presumption against their 
characterization as merely descriptive, rather than as norm-
reinforcing. Nor is there anything about the context of those phrases’ 
use in the usual case that undermines or otherwise minimizes their 
force. Nonetheless, a court would be free to decide that the religious 
meaning, while persisting, does not rise to the level of endorsement or 
coercion, depending on the relevant Establishment Clause test that is 
being applied. 
3. Anno Domini.  A more difficult case is presented by the use of 
the phrase “A.D.,” or anno domini, or the English-language 
equivalent “In the Year of the Lord” on official documents. Because 
the language is facially religious—indeed, it refers to the birth of the 
 
 245. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (“If a performative provisionally succeeds . . . then it 
is . . . only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority 
through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices.”). 
 246. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000) (“A religious 
message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event.”). 
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Christian savior—it would invoke the rebuttable presumption of 
religious meaning. It seems that the government might, however, 
succeed in rebutting the presumption by showing that the phrase acts 
as a mere placeholder, a now-arbitrary way of referring to a particular 
historical event that marks the beginning of the current era. The 
phrase could be, and sometimes is, replaced by the term “C.E.”—
Common (or Christian, or Current) Era. 
At the same time, however, labeling time with reference to the 
birth of “the Lord” seems less neutral than the sort of verbal quoting 
or depicting that occurs when a city name references a saint or a 
mission that forms part of its history. The phrase appears to be 
asserting a reality—that a particular historical figure was the Lord 
and that time started anew with his birth—that is less neutral than the 
fact that the city of Corpus Christi was named after the Roman 
Catholic feast day on which a Spanish explorer first discovered the 
area.247 
It is possible that the government could rebut the presumption 
by showing that there is no history of divisiveness or subordination 
concealed by the use of our common dating system. The plausibility 
of this argument would depend again on historical analysis, but there 
are reasons to doubt its validity as well. As the cultural anthropologist 
Carol Delaney has pointed out, “[w]e think of the calendar as a 
neutral kind of chronological record-keeping mechanism, but it is 
actually a highly political institution.”248 Governments have often 
manipulated calendars for political ends—to suggest that time begins 
anew with a particular, foundational political event, for example, as in 
the adoption of the French Revolutionary calendar.249 And indeed, 
there is some evidence that the powerful act of designating time has 
stirred some religious division. Jehovah’s Witnesses use only the 
designation C.E. in their official publications, whereas the Southern 
Baptist Convention has advocated retaining the traditional A.D. as “a 
reminder of the preeminence of Christ and His gospel in world 
history” and “a reminder to those in this secular age of the 
importance of Christ’s life and mission and emphasizes to all that 
 
 247. City of Corpus Christi, History, http://www.cctexas.com/?fuseaction=main.view&page 
=109 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 248. CAROL DELANEY, INVESTIGATING CULTURE: AN EXPERIENTIAL INTRODUCTION TO 
ANTHROPOLOGY 88 (2004). 
 249. Indeed, the calendar adopted by the secularist French revolutionaries was intended to 
be “very ‘rational’ and designed to counteract the ‘irrational’ elements inherent in religion, 
specifically to break the hold of Christianity over the people.” Id. 
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history is ultimately His Story.”250 There is thus a possibility that the 
term retains its religious significance. Nonetheless, its use in 
documents may or may not constitute an endorsement of religion or a 
coercive religious act.251 
CONCLUSION 
This Article begins from the intuition that not all forms of 
ceremonial deism are identical and from the assumption that meaning 
can change over time in ways that are relevant to Establishment 
Clause doctrine. Drawing on speech act theory, it argues that the 
iterability of language opens it up to a variety of possible meanings, 
through which even facially religious language may lose its religious 
force. This is not to say, however, that mere repetition or long use 
always deprives a symbol, term, or practice of its force. In fact, there 
is much reason to be skeptical of courts’ claims that a facially religious 
practice has lost it religious meaning. The offhand way in which 
judges often make the assertion is thus unsatisfying from a theoretical 
and doctrinal standpoint. 
This Article therefore proposes that courts’ analysis should rely 
on a rebuttable presumption that a facially religious phrase or 
practice has continuing religious meaning. Moreover, courts may 
consider the illocutionary force and the sociohistorical context of a 
term when deciding whether the presumption has been rebutted. If 
the presumption has not been rebutted, courts should then apply one 
of the relevant Establishment Clause tests. Although this approach 
does not add up to a perfectly determinate test for challenges to 
 
 250. S. Baptist Convention, SBC Resolution: On Retaining the Traditional Method of 
Calendar Dating (B.C./A.D.), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=298 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2009). At the same time, Professor Delaney has argued that the use of C.E. is not 
particularly preferable. DELANEY, supra note 248, at 86. “But just whose common era?” she 
asks. “Jews preceded Christians by at least a millennium and the two religions have surely not 
merged despite the hyphen in Judeo-Christian. I find CE a euphemism because the common era 
still begins with Christ’s birth and, thus, conceals the political implications.” Id. Professor 
Delaney’s comment reveals another instance of drawing on and covering over the origins of a 
phrase. 
 251. See, e.g., benMiriam v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 647 F. Supp. 84, 85–86 (M.D.N.C. 
1986) (holding that the use of the abbreviation “A.D.” on government documents is not 
unconstitutional because the phrase is secular and because it “does not make criminal the 
holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor does it force anyone to embrace any religious 
belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets” (quoting Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961))). 
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ceremonial deism, it is nonetheless a vast improvement over the 
current state of affairs. 
This Article does not provide a clear set of answers to difficult 
Establishment Clause questions. Instead, it suggests an analysis of 
ceremonial deism that draws on the insights of linguistic theory and 
proposes a presumption that may serve to counteract the tendency of 
courts dealing with ceremonial deism to fall back too easily on the 
notion that such phrases are merely descriptive or used for patriotic 
rather than religious purposes. In addition, it attempts to lay some 
theoretical groundwork under a concept that has remained largely 
unsupported. In so doing, it also aspires to remedy the distortion in 
the doctrine that occurs when ceremonial deism is treated as an 
exception that is subject to no particular Establishment Clause test 
and no articulable standards. 
